CREATING A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR CREDIBLE U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA = 한반도 내 신뢰성 있는 미국 확장억제를 구현하기 위한 견고한 기반 구축 연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

While the United States has reduced the overall number of nuclear warheads
supporting U.S. extended deterrence in East Asia, North Korea has been developing
additional nuclear weapons and missiles to maintain a stronger security posture against the
United States. Therefore, South Korea, which is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is
getting more skeptical of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear policy in regard to South Korea.
Meanwhile, a well-organized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Nuclear
Planning Group (NPG) has assured allies of the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence
policy in Europe. This study demonstrates that South Korea could enhance its assurance of
U.S. commitment to extended deterrence by adopting the NATO NPG as a model of a
nuclear consultative body. Enhancing South Korea-U.S. nuclear policy coordination as
presented in this thesis would bolster extended deterrence of North Korea’s threats and
enhance South Korea’s assurance of U.S. extended deterrence.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. INTRODUCTION 1
• A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1
• B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 1
• C. LITERATURE REVIEW 3
• 1. The Changing Security Circumstances and the Challenges to the Credibility of U.S. Extended Deterrence in East Asia 4
• 2. The Policy of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing and the NPG 7
• 3. Prior Studies about Adopting the Policy of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing as a Model of Nuclear Policy Coordination in South Korea 10
• D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 15
• E. RESEARCH DESIGN 17
• F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 18
• II. THE ASSURANCE FUNCTIONS OF NATO’S NUCLEAR SHARING MECHANISM 19
• A. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATO NPG 20
• B. THE ROLE OF NON-NUCLEAR NATO ALLIES23
• 1. Political Drivers of Establishing the NPG 23
• 2. The Non-Nuclear NATO Allies’ Accomplishment in the NPG 25
• 3. Non-Nuclear NATO Allies’ Attitude toward NSNWs in Europe 27
• C. ALLIES’ ASSURANCE IN NATO 29
• 1. Consultative Mechanisms for Allies’ Assurance 30
• 2. Combined Exercises for Allies’ Assurance 31
• 3. A Brief Case Study of Assurance: Greece 33
• D. CONCLUSION 39
• III. NATO’S NUCLEAR SHARING POLICY AS A NEW ROK-U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY MODEL 43
• A. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 44
• 1. The Advent of the Second Nuclear Age after the Collapse of the Soviet Union and Its Features 44
• 2. The Occurrence of Grave Threat in East Asia: North Korea’s Nuclear Armament 45
• 3. U.S. Policies to Reduce the Role of Nuclear Warheads in Security 47
• B. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT ROK-U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY COORDINATION 47
• 1. The Development of the Current Nuclear Consultative Body between South Korea and the United States 47
• 2. The Limitations of the EDSCG 50
• C. NATO NPG AS A MODEL FOR AN ROK-U.S. NUCLEAR CONSULTATIVE PROCESS 52
• 1. Common Nuclear Planning and Sharing Nuclear Information 53
• 2. Active Role in Nuclear Mission Exercises 54
• D. THE WAY TO STRENGTHEN THE EDSCG COMPARABLE TO THE NATO NPG 56
• 1. Organization 56
• 2. Nuclear Planning and Sharing Nuclear Information 58
• 3. Nuclear Mission Exercises 59
• E. CONCLUSION 60
• IV. CONCLUSION 65
• A. SUMMARY OF THESIS CONCLUSIONS 65
• 1. The NPG in Europe 65
• 2. An NPG for South Korea 69
• B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES 71
• C. LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 73
• D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 73
• E. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 74
• LIST OF REFERENCES 77
• INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 85