(The) US-Iran nuclear negotiation stalemate from G. W. Bush to Trump : interactions between international negotiators and their domestic constituents

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Why did the US-Iran nuclear negotiation process from 2002 to 2018 fluctuate and end in a stalemate? By applying Putnam’s two-level game theory, this research demonstrates that the interactions between the international negotiators and their domestic constituents significantly impact the negotiation outcomes. For the US, the Congressional debate on the plausibility of pursuing regime change policy in Iran influenced the US negotiators and their negotiation strategy. For Iran, the gradual coalitions of the conservative power base within the governmental establishment fostered close coordination between the Iranian negotiators and their domestic constituents. From President G. W. Bush to President Trump, this case study shows the historical overview of the nuclear negotiations. Then, it explains the causes of the five specific outcomes with the concept of win-set. For each period, this research observes progress in the international negotiator’s strategy and the domestic constituents’ policy preferences and coalitions in the US and Iran. These progressions either expanded or contracted the win-set size, effectively visualizing the negotiation process and outcomes. Thus, this research highlights that dissecting the interactions between international and domestic politics is essential to understanding fluctuation in negotiation outcomes.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

2002년부터 2018년까지 미국-이란 핵 협상은 타결과 결렬을 반복하였을까? 본고는 퍼트남의 양면게임 이론을 적용하여 국제 협상가와 국내 구성원 간의 상호작용이 협상 결과에 영향을 미친다는 것을 발견한다. 미국의 경우, 의회 내에서 이란 정권교체 정책 추진에 대해 논의해 왔으며, 이 논의의 형태가 미국 협상가들의 전략 구상에 영향을 미쳤다. 이란의 경우, 보수 세력이 결집되는 과정에서 이란 협상가와 국내 구성원 간의 긴밀한 협력이 이뤄지는 모습을 볼 수 있다. 본 연구는 G. W. 부시 행정부 1기부터 트럼프 행정부까지 총 다섯 가지의 미국-이란 핵 협상 사례를 다루고 있으며, 퍼트남이 제시한 윈셋(Win-set) 개념을 활용하여 그 결과의 원인을 분석한다. 미국과 이란의 국제 협상가의 전략과 국내 구성원의 정책 선호도와 연합을 시기별로 관찰하며, 윈셋의 크기가 확장 또는 축소되는 과정을 자세히 설명한다. 이와 같은 사례 분석은 국제 협상 결과와 이에 영향을 미친 요인을 이해하기 위해서는 국제정치와 국내정치의 상호작용을 분석하는 것이 중요함을 강조한다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Table of Contents
• List of Tables and Figures .................................................................................................. iii
• Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
• 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
• 1.1. Research Question ........................................................................................................ 1
• 1.2. Brief Argument ............................................................................................................. 4
• 1.3. Research Method ......................................................................................................... 6
• 2. Literature Review: Domestic Factors Affecting the Negotiation Outcomes . 7
• 2.1. The US Leadership Change and Policy Preferences ............................................ 7
• 2.2. The Nuclear Hedging Strategy of Iran ................................................................ 11
• 2.3. Factional Politics and Systematic Vulnerability of Iran ...................................... 13
• 3. Theoretical Framework: Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory ...................... 17
• 3.1. Original Theory and its Contribution .................................................................. 17
• 3.2. Application ......................................................................................................... 22
• 3.2.1. The Level 1 and Level 2 Players ........................................................................ 22
• 3.2.2. US and Iranian Win-Sets: Initial Size ................................................................. 24
• 3.2.3. The Win-Set Size Determinants .......................................................................... 26
• 3.2.3.1. The US as an Enforcing State ............................................................................... 26
• 3.2.3.2. Iran as a Target State ............................................................................................ 32
• 3.3. Hypothesis .......................................................................................................... 38
• 4. Case study and Analysis: US-Iran Nuclear Negotiation ................................ 42
• 4.1 G. W. Bush 1st Term and Khatami 2nd Term (2002-2004) ................................... 42
• 4.2 G. W. Bush 2nd Term and Ahmadinejad 1st Term (2005-2008) ........................... 55
• 4.3 Obama 1st Term and Ahmadinejad 2nd Term (2009-2012) ................................... 69
• 4.4 Obama 2nd Term and Rouhani 1st Term (2013-2016) .......................................... 81
• 4.5 Trump 1st Term and Rouhani 2nd Term (2017-2020) .......................................... 98
• 5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 105
• 5.1 Result ................................................................................................................ 105
• 5.2 Limitation ......................................................................................................... 111
• 5.3 Implication ....................................................................................................... 114
• Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 118
• 국문초록 ....................................................................................................................... 126