Making extended deterrence credible : European responses to the US nuclear umbrella

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Extended deterrence has been the dominant element of United States security policy and has emphasized the primary goals of deterring potential aggressors and assuring allies. This article focuses on the latter by delving into how US security assurance strategies convince its European NATO allies adequately. Descriptions of the importance of the Alliance in US nuclear policy and the maintenance of forward-deployed US short-range nuclear missiles on European territory demonstrate unwavering commitment to NATO. However, France and Germany, which are now the main pillars of European security after Brexit, have taken broadly contrasting stances regarding the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. Three particular politico-military credibility elements – political ties, legal mechanisms, and defense cooperation – have been chosen in order to determine why this might be. Drawing on qualitative comparative historical analysis, Germany’s high level of credibility in US extended deterrence can be attributed to its own restriction on developing own nuclear capabilities in light of legally binding mechanisms and long-standing defense cooperation with the US. Possession of a nation’s own nuclear weapons significantly affects the diverging results of the analysis of politico-military credibility elements. Specifically, the possession of nuclear capabilities grants France not only a greater autonomous defense posture but also a lesser reliance on the US nuclear umbrella. To this end, this article concentrates particularly on the development of Europe’s own modern defense capabilities in line with recent rising tensions in the transatlantic relationship between the US and NATO following the Trump administration’s criticism of the organization and growing Russian aggression. Especially, France has asserted an expansion of European strategic autonomy in defense and security which includes a nuclear deterrence dimension. This French-led Euro-deterrence has been spotlighted as the most feasible alternative to the US nuclear umbrella, but the European Union has not yet reached any constructive consensus to that end, largely due to differing assessments of the credibility of US extended deterrence.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. Introduction 1
• 1.1 Research Questions and Objectives 1
• 1.2 Problem Statement 3
• 1.3 Methodology 13
• II. Theoretical Framework: Extended Deterrence and Assurance 18
• 2.1 Concept of Extended Deterrence and Assurance 18
• 2.2 Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance 20
• 2.3 Hypotheses for the Credibility Assessment of US Extended Deterrence 25
• IIⅠ. US & NATO Nuclear Deterrence in Europe 31
• 3.1 US Nuclear Policy and NATO 31
• 3.2 NATO’s Strategic Concepts of Nuclear Deterrence 36
• 3.3 NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent Capabilities 40
• 3.4 NATO’s Nuclear-Sharing Arrangements 45
• IV. French and German Responses to US Extended Deterrence 50
• 4.1 Responses to the Credibility of US Extended Deterrence 51
• 4.1.1 France 51
• 4.1.2 Germany 55
• 4.2 Credibility Elements 58
• 4.2.1 Political Ties 58
• 4.2.2 Legal Mechanisms 63
• 4.2.3 Defense Cooperation 67
• V. Discussion 73
• 5.1 The Principal Findings 73
• 5.2 European Strategic Autonomy in Nuclear Deterrence 77
• VI. Conclusion 82
• Bibliography 85
• Appendix 100