미국 동맹정책 변화에 대한 한국과 일본의 대응 비교 : 연루와 방기 모델을 중심으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study focuses on the security dilemma applied to alliance relations in the East Asia in postwar era. By analyzing U.S. foreign policy and comparing changes in U.S. bilateral alliances with Korea and Japan, it explains the reasons behind the choices between support or nonsupport of allies and tension between fears of entrapment and abandonment. In doing so, this study aims to answer some important questions that Korea is facing now: How will the U.S. foreign policy change affect regional stability in the East Asia? What are expected domestic and international impacts on Korea and Japan followed by the expansion of their role in the alliance? How will the U.S. alliance policy toward the East Asia change in the future?
By the mutual necessity among its members, an alliance can be either sustained or disbanded. The formation and the characteristic of alliance is also transformable as it reflects the ever-changing nature of international situation. Considering this strategic security environment of international politics, applying notable takeaways from realist theory enables to trace incidents and to uncover motivations that affect formal alliances. Especially, fear of abandonment and entrapment can affect alliance management: the dilemma between abandonment and entrapment reflects the tension exists in an asymmetric benefit relationship and the changing international situations applied to each member of alliance in a very sensitive manner. And the alliances between U.S. and pivotal East Asian states – South Korea and Japan – provide good examples of how abandonment and entrapment influence alliance interactions.
Many pundits predicted that alliances, especially bilateral alliances, would disintegrate when the Cold War ends. Yet even after the Cold War and bipolarity between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ended, the U.S. has been seeking to strengthen its relations with its former allies. To maintain U.S.-centered world order, the Washington still wants to exert its influence through those allies in certain regions. In particular, the East Asia, where communist and democratic countries are in confrontation, and where North Korea's nuclear threat lurks, is a crucial region for U.S. foreign policy. The U.S., therefore, continue to have South Korea and Japan as their allies and those two allies also wants to take part in U.S.’s global security policies for their own interests.
U.S. foreign policy have changed accordance with flux of international security environment. A series of incidents during postwar era has important ramifications for America's deterrent posture in the East Asia. Traditionally, the U.S. deterrence for its East Asian allies relied on direct defense, the deterrence by denial through the unmatched ability to defeat any conventional attack against its allied territory. However, the changes in U.S. security policy due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks required more commitment of their allies. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and countering termism became a top priority in maintaining the US alliance. That is, those allies of Washington, who had been enjoyed U.S.’ strong defense capabilities, need to participate in the battle with them. South Korea and Japan were no exception.
The rise of China, a powerful challenger to the U.S. hegemony, also led refinement of U.S. conventional extended deterrence in the East Asia. As China makes it hard for the United States to militarily coerce it in a future regional crisis unless major strategic interests are at stake by raising the stakes, the Pentagon seemed to put more emphasis on deterrence by punishment instead. Furthermore, the U.S. expanded its Asia-Pacific region-centered policy to the Indo-Pacific to protect its interests and pursue regional stability. Consequently, the Washington keep stressing the need for South Korea and Japan to invest more in their own denial capabilities.
A classical alliance dilemma of abandonment and entrapment evokes as the U.S. foreign policy and the demands on its allies have changed. An ambiguous commitment to defend its East Asian allies in a conflict of lesser interest to Washington contributes to fears of abandonment on the part of allies. It also increases Chinese risk-taking. A strong commitment, however, increase allies’ risk-taking during crisis and raises the specter of entrapment in an unwanted conflict with China. Therefore, when a situation arises in which the U.S. security policy conflicts with China's, both Korea and Japan may face a dilemmatic choice between maintaining a close alliance with US and improving relations with China.
Confronting this dilemma, South Korea and Japan took different positions in US alliance depending on the security policies they pursued. Although the Korea-US alliance and the US-Japan alliance were formed around the same time, there were differences in their status and roles as allies. While South Korea has participated more a bilateral standpoint as an ally despite its asymmetric relations (e.g. dispatching troops Vietnam), Japan has taken a more beneficiary standpoint because they were unable to conduct active military activities on the grounds of its peace constitution. In this situation, the redeployment of U.S. forces abroad due to changes in U.S. security policy and the demand for commitment mean that Korea and Japan must find a new equilibrium.
In fact, South Korea and Japan share several aspects that interact very closely with U.S. foreign policy. For instance, both have U.S. forces stationed in their territory and being a security beneficiary from the United States (e.g. Nuclear umbrella). Thus, a change in the U.S. security strategy is directly reflected in the withdrawal or reduction of US troop which may cause changes in status as an ally and instability at home and abroad. At the same time, Korea and Japan are in a similar geopolitical position and share values of a liberal democratic system. As those two countries have great economic and military influence in the East Asian region, they also have been geostrategic pivots for the United States. In the past, they have been to block the expansion of communist countries, and now they are in the position to hinder China's expansionist policies.
Then what made them take a different position toward their alliance with the United States? This study argues that depending on how Korea and Japan perceive threats in the region respectively, they take different alliance policy with the United States. For instance, South Korea and Japan have showed different reactions to the U.S. policies toward the North Korea during the Bush administration. In response to the Washington’s hardline policy, Seoul rather wanted to take a lead emphasizing resolution through dialogue. This uncooperative action broke the solidarity of the ROK-U.S. alliance and, as a result, heightened concerns about abandonment. Conversely, in the case of Japan, they perceived the North Korean nuclear issue as a serious threat to their national security and actively supported the U.S. policy.
Regarding Chinese risk, the crisis over the Senkaku islands and the deployment of HHAAD in Korea can be cases in point. Washington has urged both parties to exercise restraint, knowing that Tokyo would expect it to come to its defense should the conflict spiral out of control. Failure to do so would undermine American credibility and could lead to even greater conflicts in the region. Yet, the Japanese government seems ambivalent about U.S. commitment; it is unsure of what exactly the U.S. would be willing to bring to the fight. The deployment of THAAD promoted by the ROK and the U.S. to prepare for the North Korean nuclear suffered from Chinese opposition. South Korea’s Moon administration withheld its active participation in THAAD operation.
These recent examples show that, even for mutual security interests of alliance, members can be stuck in new dilemma with an accordance of changing environment and emerging new security threats. At the same time, the United States, which has been a beneficiary of asymmetric alliances with South Korea and Japan, is now rather a subject of entrapment in their in bilateral alliances. This can be said to be a renewed application of the theory of 'Abandonment' and 'Entrapment,’ which is, I argue, having much explanatory power in analyzing and predicting the relations of alliance in postwar era.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론 1
• Ⅱ. 동맹이론 6
• 1. 동맹의 정의와 유형 6
• 1) 동맹의 정의 6
• 2) 동맹의 유형 9
• 2. 동맹 딜레마 16
• 1) 안보자율성교환 모델 16
• 2) 연루와 방기모델 19
• Ⅲ. 한미동맹과 미일동맹의 형성 27
• 1. 한미동맹 27
• 2. 미일동맹의 형성과 미일안보조약 체결 31
• 3. 공통점과 차이점 36
• Ⅳ. 미국 동맹정책의 변화 40
• 1. 9.11 이전 미국의 안보정책 40
• 2. 9.11 이후 미국의 안보정책 42
• 1) 부시 행정부 42
• 2) 오바마 행정부 47
• 3) 트럼프 행정부 52
• Ⅴ. 한국과 일본의 대응 56
• 1. 한국의 대응 56
• 1) 노무현 정부에서의 연루와 방기 57
• (1) 대북정책과 동맹딜레마 61
• (2) 전시작전통제권 전환문제 64
• (3) 이라크 파병에서 나타난 한국과 미국의 동맹 인식 68
• (4) 주한미군의 전략적 유연성 문제와 노무현 정부의 동북아 균형자론 72
• 2) 이명박, 박근혜 정부에서의 연루와 방기의 사례 73
• (1) 전시작전통제권전환 연기 74
• (2) 사드배치문제 77
• 3) 문재인 정부에서의 연루와 방기의 사례 82
• (1) 사드배치문제의 전환 82
• (2) 호르무즈 파병 요청 85
• 2. 일본의 대응 90
• 1) 고이즈미 정부에서의 연루와 방기의 딜레마 91
• (1) 고이즈미 정부의 미일동맹과 딜레마 93
• (2) 미국 동맹지원을 위한 법적 근거 마련 96
• (3) 자위대의 이라크 파병 98
• (4) 미국의 미사일방어체제 합류 99
• 2) 민주당 정부에서의 연루와 방기의 사례 102
• (1) 후텐마 기지이전 문제 105
• (2) 하토야마 정부의 동맹 전략 변환 110
• 3) 아베 정권에서의 연루와 방기의 사례 112
• (1) 미국의 인도태평양 정책과 쿼드에의 주도적 참여 119
• (2) 자위대법과 헌법개정의 움직임 121
• (3) 센카쿠열도 문제와 미국의 연루 126
• Ⅵ. 결론 136