Between Entrapment and Proliferation : Alliance Management of the US and China over Two Koreas' Nuclear Weapons Programs = 연루와 핵확산의 딜레마: 남북한 핵개발에 대한 미국과 중국의 동맹 관리

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

By examining the alliance management of the US and China over two Koreas’ nuclear weapons programs, this dissertation finds the cause of nuclear restraint from security commitment. It asserts that a patron takes entrapment risk and increases security commitment when it fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment. This dissertation employs the combination of a case comparison method and a within-case method because nuclear restraint is a complex process that follows multiple steps, including rollback, suspension, or resumption of the nuclear weapons program.
From 1974 to 1982, the US provided South Korea with an increasing commitment level because Washington worried more about nuclear proliferation than entrapment. The US perceived high risk of nuclear proliferation, which might cause a major destabilizing effect in Asia, where Washington built a security network of bilateral alliances. To avoid nuclear proliferation, the US took entrapment risk and terminated South Korea’s nuclear weapons development.
In contrast, from 1993 to 2009, China provided North Korea with a decreasing commitment level because Beijing was more concerned with entrapment than nuclear proliferation. China perceived high risk of entrapment from a possible North Korean regime collapse and a massive refugee influx across the border. To avoid entrapment, China remained at a low commitment level to North Korea, which eventually conducted nuclear tests and withdrew from nuclear negotiations.
This finding expands our knowledge about the commitment by differentiating the risks of entrapment and nuclear proliferation. It also emphasizes the role of positive security commitment for nuclear restraint.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

이 논문은 남북한 핵개발에 대한 미국과 중국의 동맹 관리를 연구함으로써 핵무기 개발 제지의 원인을 안보 공약에서 찾고, 후견국이 연루보다 핵확산을 더 두려워할 때 연루의 위험을 감수하면서 안보 공약을 증가한다고 주장한다. 핵 제지는 핵개발의 롤백(rollback), 잠정중단, 재개 등 여러 단계를 거치는 복잡한 과정인 점을 고려하여, 사례 비교와 단일 사례 연구 방법을 활용한다.
1974년부터 1982년까지 미국은 연루보다 핵확산을 더 두려워했기 때문에 한국에 대한 공약을 증가했다. 미국은 양자 동맹 형태의 안보 네트워크를 구축한 아시아에서 주요한 불안정 효과가 나타날 것으로 보고 핵확산의 위험을 높게 인식했다. 미국은 핵확산을 회피하기 위해 연루의 위험을 감수했고, 한국은 핵개발을 종료했다.
이와 대조적으로 1993년부터 2009년까지 중국은 핵확산보다 연루를 더 두려워했기 때문에 북한에 대한 공약을 감소했다. 중국은 북한 체제 붕괴 및 대규모 난민 유입 가능성을 보고 연루의 위험을 높게 인식했다. 중국은 연루를 회피하기 위해 낮은 수준의 공약을 유지했고, 결과적으로 북한은 핵실험을 감행하고 핵협상으로부터 철수했다.
이러한 연구 결과는 연루와 핵확산의 위험을 구별함으로써 안보 공약에 대한 지식을 확장하는데 기여하며, 핵 제지(nuclear restraint)를 위한 적극적 안전보장(positive security assurance)의 역할을 강조한다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. INTRODUCTION 1
• 1. Puzzle 2
• 2. Alliance and Nuclear Weapons 7
• Alliance Management in Nuclear Restraint 7
• Client's Motivation: Fear of Abandonment 9
• Patron's Motivation: Nuclear Nonproliferation 12
• 3. Argument 19
• 4. Plan of Dissertation 24
• II. THEORIES OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT 27
• 1. Theoretical Overview 27
• Patron's Management Tool: Commitment 27
• Patron's Management Challenge: Entrapment 32
• Avoiding Entrapment: Withdrawal 35
• Limits of Withdrawal 41
• 2. Theoretical Framework 46
• Options of a Nuclear Weapons Program 47
• Definition and Scope of Commitment 52
• Avoiding Nuclear Proliferation: Commitment 58
• Hard and Soft Commitments 69
• 3. Research Design 80
• Case Selection 82
• Sources 89
• III. THE US AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IN SOUTH KOREA 91
• 1. US Risk-taking Alliance Policy 91
• Containment and the Hub-and-Spoke System 91
• Dtente and Peace Through Partnership 97
• Peace Through Strength and Alliances 106
• 2. South Korea from 1974 to 1976 112
• Withdrawal and Warnings of Proliferation 112
• Withholding of Nuclear Energy Cooperation 120
• Assurance Despite Disengagement 123
• South Korea's Reluctant Ratification of the NPT 130
• 3. South Korea from 1977 to 1982 134
• A Proposal for Complete Withdrawal 134
• The 1981 Summit to Restore the Alliance 143
• Termination of the Nuclear Weapons Program 150
• 4. Conclusion 153
• IV. CHINA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN NORTH KOREA 161
• 1. China's Risk-averse Alliance Policy 161
• A Reluctant Intervention in the Korean War 161
• The Alliance of Lips and Teeth 165
• Non-Alignment and the New Security Concept 171
• 2. North Korea from 1993 to 1994 180
• Disengagement and the Yongbyon Reactor 180
• Strategic Dilemma and Entrapment Fear 186
• Opposition to International Pressure 190
• Praise for the Agreed Framework 194
• 3. North Korea from 2003 to 2009 197
• Devotion to Reform and Opening 197
• Shuttle Diplomacy and the Six-Party Talks 204
• Failed Nuclear Restraint 210
• 4. Conclusion 213
• V. CONCLUSION 221
• 1. Main Argument and Findings 221
• 2. Policy Implications 228
• Bibliography 233
• Appendix 1. List of Important Visits by Chinese Leaders to North Korea 263
• Appendix 2. List of Important Visits by North Korean Leaders to China 265
• Abstract in Korean 267
• Acknowledgments 268