The ROK-US alliance is a typical asymmetric alliance with a gap in national power. The purpose of this study is to examine the changes in the ROK-US alliance from the perspective of the security-autonomy trade-off alliance model and the abandonment-en...
The ROK-US alliance is a typical asymmetric alliance with a gap in national power. The purpose of this study is to examine the changes in the ROK-US alliance from the perspective of the security-autonomy trade-off alliance model and the abandonment-entrapment dilemma model, which are asymmetric alliance models, and to find out how these changes in alliance relations have had on the Korean Military Power Construction. Immediately after the mutual defense treaty between the ROK-US was signed, Korea was completely dependent on the United States militarily and economically. However, as the national power of Korea gradually increased, the autonomy of Korea gradually expanded, and the ROK-US alliance continued to evolve and develop along with the changes in the international security environment. Through this study, it was found that the construction of military power in Korea has also been developed under the direct and indirect influence of the changes in the ROK-US alliance relationship. The results of the study through literature research and historical case analysis are as follows.
First, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, Korea's autonomy was limited, such as abandoning nuclear weapons development or being limited range in missile development, due to the asymmetric ROK-US alliance. However, the signing of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the annual holding of the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), which recognized Korea as a security partner, established equal command relations between countries. The creation of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command and the Military Committee (MC) are also examples of enhancing the military autonomy of Korea. Looking at the impact of the changes in the ROK-US alliance at this time on the construction of military power, the Park Chung-hee administration, which sought to prevent the withdrawal of US troops in Korea, received financial aid from the United States as a result of the dispatch of Korean troops to the Vietnam War and laid the foundation for the construction of the military power of the Korean military. And the reduction of US troops of the Nixon and Carter administrations caused the Korean government to fear abandonment. To overcome this, President Park Chung-hee promoted “self-defense”. The establishment of the Agency for Defense Development for independent development of weapons, the “Five-Year Plan for Modernization of the Korean Military (1971-1975),” followed by the “Yulgok Project (1974-1981),” served as a direct opportunity to increase the Korean military power.
Second, in the early 1980s, the Chun Doo-hwan administration desperately needed US support to overcome the limitations of political legitimacy, and thus pursued ‘alliance-dependent self-defense', which focused on buying US weapons rather than the independent development of weapons promoted by President Park Chung-hee. This resulted in higher dependence. Despite the reduction in the size of the USFK in accordance with the East Asian Strategic Initiative of the US, President Roh Tae-woo promoted the redemption of the Operational Control in Armistice, thanks to the growth of Korea's national power, and greatly improved Korea's autonomy. As a result, the Roh Tae-woo administration desperately needed a substantial increase in power to cope with the reduction of USFK, and the third Yulgok project (1987-1992) was promoted. However, Since the 1st Special Measures Agreement (SMA) between the ROK and the US in 1991, the ROK shared some of the cost of stationing US forces in Korea, which limited the flexibility of the use of defense budget to build Korean military power.
Third, the Roh Moo-hyun administration pursued the Self-Reliant Defense Policy and promoted the transition of wartime operational control under the influence of the abandonment-entrapment dilemma due to disagreements between the ROK and the US on how to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and the policy to reduce USFK in accordance with the Bush administration's relocation plan in the 2000s. In particular, the Roh Moo-hyun administration revealed that the establishment of Forces to equip the ROK military's independent operational capabilities after the transition of wartime operational control rights is the key to military power construction. Accordingly, a military power construction policy was promoted not only to reinforce deterrence against North Korea, but also to expand power in preparation for potential future threats.
The Lee Myung-bak administration pursued policies to increase the reliance on the alliance, such as restoring and strengthening the relationship between the ROK-US alliance and postponing the transfer of wartime operational control and further strengthening cooperation between the ROK and the US in response to successive North Korean provocations, such as the bombardment of the Cheonan Ship and the Yeonpyeong Island attack. As weapons were urgently introduced to prepare for the existing North Korean provocation threat, the Lee Myung-bak administration has impeded the development of the domestic defense industry by promoting the introduction of mostly US-made weapons. Also, as the transfer of wartime OPCON was postponed, the timing of the introduction of related weapons was partially delayed.
In the Park Geun-hye administration, the confrontation between North and South Korea was further intensified due to the North's successive nuclear tests and missile launch tests, and the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, while cooperation between the United States and Korea was further strengthened. Also, the wartime operational control authority, which was decided to be transferred in 2015, was agreed to reenact ‘ the wartime operational control right based on conditions ’. In terms of military power construction , unlike the Lee Myung-bak administration, the priorities for securing power was adjusted. Power against North Korean nuclear and WMD threats was secured first, while power against the provocation threats of North Korea was focused on securing superiority to North Korea.
The policy implications of the study results in this paper imply that security and autonomy must be balanced for a solid ROK-US alliance. To this end, Korea's autonomy must be increased, and in order to do so, it is necessary not only to increase the proportion of the ROK military's leading role in the Korean defense but also to seek new roles that can contribute to a reciprocal and comprehensive alliance relationship. Also, when considering the limited defense expenditure in the construction of military power, selection and concentration are necessary. In particular, in response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, the ROK and the United States should focus on the mission to be undertaken by South Korea based on the concept of a sophisticated division of roles. Besides, it should be able to provide practical help to US security by actively cooperating with the US's BMD, along with efforts to strengthen Korea's capability against North Korean nuclear weapons (Kill Chain, KAMD) in a short period of time. When the exchange of security support between the allies is made in this way, it will be possible to engage in negotiations with the ROK-US share of defense costs.