China's growing power and attitude toward its coercive use has profound implications for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. One critical component to that stability is China's crisis behavior in key territorial disputes throughout the region. Thi...
China's growing power and attitude toward its coercive use has profound implications for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. One critical component to that stability is China's crisis behavior in key territorial disputes throughout the region. This paper seeks to understand the nature of China's nuclear deterrent threats in the post-Cold War era by identifying the conditions under which Chinese leaders choose nuclear coercion over other viable policy alternatives. Second, the paper explores the utility of applying prospect theory to China's crisis behavior to identify those conditions within a new prospect theory model. The findings suggest that, first, the decision to engage in nuclear coercion is influenced, in large part, by considerations about the status of one’s own territorial sovereignty and integrity. Second, the findings challenge realist predictions about China’s military trajectory by suggesting that, as China’s power grows, Beijing will be placed in fewer disadvantageous positions, thereby limiting the need to adopt coercive policies like nuclear threats. Finally, these findings suggest that prospect theory has significant explanatory and predictive power, both in international relations as well as China’s crisis management behavior.