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      (The) pursuit of nuclear weapons and power : the cases of taiwan and south Korea

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T14858098

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      The conventional realist argument has been that if a state has significant security concerns, in terms of facing a major threat to its existence such as (a) an actual threat of attack, (b) a weakened deterrence that could invite an attack, or (c) perception of threat of attack or weakened deterrence inviting attack from an adversary state with nuclear weapons, then the state will attempt to develop nuclear weapons. The corollary argument then is that if a state does not have significant security concerns, then the state will not develop nuclear weapons. But, if a state does not have significant security concerns and attempts to develop nuclear weapons, then there must have been another causal factor. This thesis proffers a small addition to the realist literature on nuclear weapons through a close analysis of two historical cases and argues that if a state perceives of nuclear weapons as a source of power, in terms of giving the state the ability (a) to influence or coerce another state into complying with its demands or (b) to resist complying with another state’s demands, then the state will attempt to develop nuclear weapons.
      This thesis examines the historical cases of Taiwan and South Korea and their attempts to develop nuclear weapons and concludes the following: (1) neither Taiwan nor South Korea had significant security concerns—they did not have concerns about an immediate attack or a weakened deterrence inviting such an attack, and the ruling regimes may have exaggerated security concerns to justify political measures prolonging their stay in power; and (2) Taiwan and South Korea may have perceived of nuclear weapons as a source of power with which to assert their policy objectives—they were highly candid with the U.S. about their frustrations with U.S. policies that seemed to undermine their policy objectives and demanded U.S. concessions that would meet their policy objectives, and the ruling regimes were highly aware that China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons meant that it had gained a status, prestige, and power that the world could not ignore.
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      The conventional realist argument has been that if a state has significant security concerns, in terms of facing a major threat to its existence such as (a) an actual threat of attack, (b) a weakened deterrence that could invite an attack, or (c) perc...

      The conventional realist argument has been that if a state has significant security concerns, in terms of facing a major threat to its existence such as (a) an actual threat of attack, (b) a weakened deterrence that could invite an attack, or (c) perception of threat of attack or weakened deterrence inviting attack from an adversary state with nuclear weapons, then the state will attempt to develop nuclear weapons. The corollary argument then is that if a state does not have significant security concerns, then the state will not develop nuclear weapons. But, if a state does not have significant security concerns and attempts to develop nuclear weapons, then there must have been another causal factor. This thesis proffers a small addition to the realist literature on nuclear weapons through a close analysis of two historical cases and argues that if a state perceives of nuclear weapons as a source of power, in terms of giving the state the ability (a) to influence or coerce another state into complying with its demands or (b) to resist complying with another state’s demands, then the state will attempt to develop nuclear weapons.
      This thesis examines the historical cases of Taiwan and South Korea and their attempts to develop nuclear weapons and concludes the following: (1) neither Taiwan nor South Korea had significant security concerns—they did not have concerns about an immediate attack or a weakened deterrence inviting such an attack, and the ruling regimes may have exaggerated security concerns to justify political measures prolonging their stay in power; and (2) Taiwan and South Korea may have perceived of nuclear weapons as a source of power with which to assert their policy objectives—they were highly candid with the U.S. about their frustrations with U.S. policies that seemed to undermine their policy objectives and demanded U.S. concessions that would meet their policy objectives, and the ruling regimes were highly aware that China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons meant that it had gained a status, prestige, and power that the world could not ignore.

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