This study paid attention to the point that the policies toward North Korea of Roh Tae-woo government(Feb. 1988-Feb. 1993) and Kim Dae-jung government(Feb. 1998-Feb. 2003) had the strongest will to improve South and North Korea relationship among the ...
This study paid attention to the point that the policies toward North Korea of Roh Tae-woo government(Feb. 1988-Feb. 1993) and Kim Dae-jung government(Feb. 1998-Feb. 2003) had the strongest will to improve South and North Korea relationship among the Korean governments in history. Hence, this study divides the process of pushing ahead with policy toward North Korea into [pushing ahead period→stability period→decline period], and analyze the international environmental and domestic political factors effected on the policy toward North Korea by each period, and further examine how policy deciders coped with them. Moreover, the common points and differences of policy decider factors shown in the process of pushing ahead with policy toward North Korea are compared.
Roh Tae-woo government used actively international environmental factors in pushing ahead period. President Roh Tae-woo could push ahead independent foreign policy, which was his policy philosophy, in the name of 'policy toward North' in the autonomous diplomatic space made by 'relative negligence' strategy of the United States. Roh Tae-woo government in stability period secured the regime's legitimacy through the success of Seoul Olympic, the anticipatory acceptance of unification movement and so on, and also ensured the strong driving force for the diplomacy toward North and policy toward North Korea by attainment of legislative power through the merger of three parties. As a result, this government established diplomatic relations with Eastern Bloc socialist states, including Soviet Union, and drew the monumental result of South and North Korea relationship through 'simultaneous admission of South and North Korea to the UN' and 'the conclusion of Inter-Korean Basic Agreement'. By these results, the constraint factors, including the resistance of cold-war conservative forces against the will to improve South and North Korea relationship of Roh Tae-woo government and the criticism of civil society on the merger of three parties could be overcome. However, North Korea's military provocation, the annulment of South-North Dialogue, the suspicion of nuclear weapons development and so on, strained South and North Korea relationship in the decline period, while the government and the ruling party became rapidly conservative, as Park Cheor-eon left the political stage and Kim Jong-hwi, hardliner to North Korea, appeared on the front stage. Furthermore, early appearance of Kim Yeong-sam, a candidate for the coming presidential election, accelerated the concentration of the cold-war conservative forces, as the lame duck syndrome of President Roh Tae-woo progressed swiftly, the desertion of conservative officialdom from President's power began to emerge.
The time of international environment formed in pushing ahead period of Kim Dae-jung government can be told as 'the reestablishment period of international order'. As the 'engagement and enlargement' strategy, which was pushed ahead by Clinton administration at that time, went on in the same context with Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung government, the policy toward North Korea of his government gained active support of the United States. The ruling coalition disintegrated by the conflict inside the government and ruling party for the policy toward North Korea after stability period, by which unfavorable political situation of minority government was formed. Moreover, as South-South sharp conflict happened by 'ladling-out controversy', the color debates toward Kim Dae-jung government were set off. However, as South-North exchange programs swiftly developed after '6.15 joint declaration', the approval rate for the policy toward North Korea of Kim Dae-jung government exceeded 90%, by which President Kim Dae-jung overcame the constraint factor of color debate based on people's strong support. In decline period, South and North Korea relationship was strained by the 'hostile policy toward North Korea' of the Bush administration in 2001. What was worse, the corruption of President's close associates and the suspicion of illegal remittance to North Korea took a toll on President's leadership. Nevertheless, President Kim Dae-jung overcame constraint factors at home and abroad based on the philosophy of policy toward North Korea on the foundation of the dialogue and cooperation between South and North Korea, and Lim Dong-won played role as the control tower of policy toward North Korea throughout the President's term to enable to push ahead the consistent engagement policy toward North Korea.
The top policy deciders of both governments had the will to improve South and North Korea relationship. They intended to resolve independently the problems on the Korean Peninsula by South and North Korea, the parties directly concerned, using actively 'autonomous diplomatic space' caused by post-Cold War era. Even though the resistance of cold-war conservative forces and South-South conflict constrained the policy toward North Korea, 'reorganization to majority of Roh Tae-woo government' and 'secured high support rate for the policy toward North Korea of Kim Dae-jung government' became the foundation, with which policy deciders of both governments were able to push ahead stably with policy toward North Korea. The responses of both governments to constraint factors, which were the tough policy toward North Korea of the United States and Korean lame-duck government, showed differently.
As the United States intervened in the problems on the Korean Peninsula due to the suspicion of nuclear weapons development by North Korea, Roh Tae-woo government faced the conservative swing of government and the ruling party, and the resistance of conservative officialdom. In addition, as Kim Yeong-sam, a candidate for the coming presidential election, took a differentiated strategy from Roh Tae-woo government, the pushing ahead with policy toward North Korea was put on the brakes. Whereas, Kim Dae-jung government, in spite of provocation of North Korea at the end of its term, used the support rate of exceeding average 80% until end of its term as justification of pushing ahead with policy toward North Korea. Furthermore, comparing the consistent pushing ahead with policy toward North Korea through Lim Dong-won, with rapidly switching the direction of policy upon the appearance of Kim Jong-hwi of Roh Tae-woo government, it was shown that the differences of dispositions and roles of both governments' policy deciders worked critically on the consistent pushing ahead with policy toward North Korea.