In recent years, pension reforms aimed at strengthening public pension systems together with reducing or abolishing private pension have been undertaken in Chile and Argentina. If we consider pension privatization has been called by a new paradigm sin...
In recent years, pension reforms aimed at strengthening public pension systems together with reducing or abolishing private pension have been undertaken in Chile and Argentina. If we consider pension privatization has been called by a new paradigm since 1990s and then mainstream, policy change in the above-mentioned countries has huge significance.
This study comparatively analyzes the pension privatization paths (institutional sustainability and change before and after the reform process toward pension privatization) in Chile and Argentina. Even though pension reforms have headed in the same directions in Chile and Argentina, the width and depth, and the forms of institutional reform are very different.
This study is composed of three main parts; first, examination of the pension reform processes and concrete institutional characteristics in Chile and Argentina, second, analysis on the internal characteristics of pension system and institutional impact before and after pension privatization, third, analysis on the political structures and processes of the institutional change.
Even though both countries had been characterized by the public pension system for long years since the early 20th century, full-funded private pension systems were introduced in 1981, Chile and 1994, Argentina. But again, in 2008, U-turn was made in Argentina, which meant to abolish the private pension and re-nationalize pension scheme. Similarly, in Chile, SPS (Solidarity Pension System) was introduced with universal basic pension, which emphasized the role of the government including the enhanced regulation on private pension.
However, it should be noted that specific forms, characteristics and processes of the pension reforms varies between two countries. While the Chile can be characterized by the ‘substitutive model’, which abolished the public pension and then introduced the private pension, the Argentina can be defined by the ‘mixed model’, which introduced the private pension with maintaining the established public pension. In other words, the forms of the path-breaking toward the radical structural reform of pension privatization are different and adjusted by the existing political conditions and/or institutional characteristics.
It should be noted that both governments had continued to undertake the central roles in terms of strict regulations on private pension and its operation, introduction of Guaranteed Minimum Pension and Basic Pension.
These differences between two countries led different responses to the problems which were caused by the introduction of private pensions. Expected impacts of private pension including high efficiency, reduction of financial burden and contribution for economic growth have never been implemented. On the contrary, new types of risk including management risk, investment risk and market risk were disclosed. In particular, coverage and benefits of pension system were lowered and inequality by gender and income level was aggravated. The fundamental purposes of pension like prevention of old-age poverty and basic income guarantee were seriously derogated.
Even though leftist governments in Chile and Argentina have endeavored to solve these problems, the results are different; private pension in Chile is sustained while it is abolished in Argentina.
However, it should be noted that similarities between two countries including strict eligibility criteria for weak non-contributory pension system, the weaknesses of contributory pension(public and private) and labour market structure with huge share of informal sector are found, and due to these factors, public pension systems were reinforced through the expansion of basic pension in two countries.
In sum, the paths of pension privatization in Chile and Argentina were adjusted by the following factors; characteristics of previous institutions and path dependency, and differences of political structures and processes. These institutional and political factors are not independent, but subject to and influenced by each other. The direction and scope of reform are decided by these factors. In conclusion, pension reform in 2008 is not simple return to the old-regime of the Bismarck, but a complex and reinforced restructuring of the Beveridge. In addition, it should be emphasized that pension restructuring has been encouraged by the direct problems of private pension systems, while the motive of pension privatization had been rooted from the specific problems of fragmentation and stratification, not from the problems of public pension itself.