Ideas for success of economic sanctions against nuclear-armed Iran and North Korea : grassroots movement and buck sharing

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Despite relentless efforts to denuclearize Iran and North Korea by intensifying the level of economic sanctions on them, it has turned out that the efforts have not come into effect. With regard to this, the literatures of economic sanctions have often tried to find what busts the economic sanctions and attributed the sanctions failures to the lack of international cooperation. Although it is valuable to know what causes the problem, this study finds that the previous literatures had paid so little attention to how to overcome the ineffectiveness of economic sanctionsthat they could have not resolved the limit of the sanctions. In this respect, this paper intends to discuss what would facilitate economic sanctions instead of what has disrupted them. To do so, this study adopts the process tracing method to examine which variables can contribute to achieving the objective of economic sanction through Iran and North Korea cases studies. The study gives two lessons which should be taken into account in devising a plan to disarm Iran and North Korea: Legitimacy and Interest-Priority matter. Developed based on the two lessons, two manoeuvres will be examined as a means to facilitating economic sanctions in order to render Iran and North Korea nuclear-disarmed: 1) mobilization of grassroots movement and 2) buck sharing. The two manoeuvres have never been discussed or tested so its effectiveness remains to be seen. Therefore, many questions might be posed as to its plausibility in practice. This study, however, is worthwhile in that it attempts to shift its attention from a problem-indicating to a problem-solving approach for the success of economic sanctions. The suggested ideas have profound implication for giving life to talks for succeeding economic sanctions against nuclear-armed Iran and North Korea, which have been overlooked while the literatures were sticking to the problem seeking.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Table of Contents
• 1. Introduction 1
• 2. Back to Basic: The Nature of Pursuing and Deterring the Nuclear Weapons 4
• 2.1 What Triggers Iran and North Korea(targets) to Indulge Nuclear Development? 4
• 2.2 What Does the U.S.(the main sender) Intend to Achieve by Denuclearizing the Targets? 7
• 3. How Imminent Nuclear Threats from Iran and North Korea Are? The Current State of Nuclear Weapons’ Development of Iran and North Korea 10
• 4. The History of Sanctions on Iran and North Korea against Their Development of Nuclear Weapons 18
• 5. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions on Iran and North Korea and Lessons from Them 25
• 5.1 Evaluation 26
• 5.2 Lessons 37
• 5.2.1 Lesson1: Legitimacy Counts 37
• 5.2.2 Lesson2: Interest-Preference for International Cooperation 43
• 6. The Ways to Improve the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions on Iran and North Korea Based on the Lessons 46
• 6.1 Mobilization of Grassroots Movements 46
• 6.2 Change “interest-preference” of sanctions busters through “buck sharing” 57
• 7. Conclusion 66
• Bibliography 68