'Double Remedies' in the concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties

국문 초록 (Abstract)

반덤핑관세 및 상계관세는 불공정 무역관행에 대처하기 위하여 GATT/WTO법에 도입된 바, 이들은 덤핑수입 또는 보조금에서 기인하는 국내산업피해를 구제하는 공통의 목적을 갖는다. 대부분의 경우 동일한 제품에 대하여 반덤핑조사와 상계관세조사가 동시에 개시되지 않는 것이 일반적이나, 미국을 위시한 몇몇 주요국들은 이미 두 조치를 동시에 적용하고 있다. 이는 대상협정 어디에도 동시부과를 금지하는 규정이 없기 때문이다. 이와 같은 동시부과는 소위 ‘중복구제’(이중구제) 문제를 초래할 수 있다. 그러나 중복구제는 두 조치가 동시 적용될 때마다 항상 발생하는 것은 아니다. 중복구제는 동시부과로 인하여 동일한 보조금 (또는 덤핑)이 한 번 이상 중복 상계되는 경우에만 발생한다.
GATT 1994 제VI:5조는 덤핑 또는 수출보조금 지급이라는 동일한 상황을 보상하기 위한 반덤핑 및 상계관세의 병과를 명시적으로 금지하고 있다. 동 조항은 수출보조금 지급이 수출가격의 하락에만 영향을 준다는, 즉 반덤핑관세가 수출보조금 전체 금액을 상계한다는 논리에 근거한 규정이다. 그런데 제VI:5조 및 기타 GATT/WTO협정은 국내보조금 지급의 상황은 별도로 규정하지 않고 있다. 국내보조금은 일반적으로 생산원가 전반에 영향을 미치므로 대상제품의 내수가격(정상가격)과 수출가격을 모두 동일하게 하락시키는 것으로 인식되어 수출보조금과 달리 덤핑과 동일한 상황을 구성하지 않는다고 보기 때문일 것이다. 중복구제문제는 최근 WTO의 US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) 사건과 미국 법원에서의 일련의 GPX 사건 이전까지 국내적으로 또한 국제적으로 큰 주목을 받지 못했다. 상기 사건들은 비시장경제국가인 중국에 대한 미국의 반덤핑 및 상계관세 병과가 어떻게 중복구제를 야기했는지 밝혀주고 있다. 이는 무엇보다도 중복구제가 수출보조금이 아닌 상황에서도 발생할 수 있음을 입증한다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다. 미국이 비시장경제국가에 대한 상계관세 미부과라는 오랜 정책을 바꿔가면서까지 중국산 제품들에 대하여 동시에 부과한 조치들과 이에 따른 분쟁들은 역설적이게도 GATT 1994 제VI:5조와 중복구제문제를 새롭게 재조명할 수 있는 기회를 제공하였다. 즉, 제VI:5조가 문언적이고 기계적인 해석에 한정되는 것에서 벗어나 이제는 보다 확장적으로 해석되고 이해될 수 있게 된 것이다.
중복구제에 관한 본 연구의 논의들은 시장상황에 상관 없이, 다시 말해 시장경제와 비시장경제에 공통적으로 적용 가능한 것이다. 이중위험금지의 원칙과 대응조치상 비례성의 원칙과 같은 법의 일반원칙들은 모든 경우에 중복구제가 금지되어야 한다는 개념을 강화시킨다. 반면 최소부과의 원칙은 적용결과에 따라 중복구제를 방지하는 제한적 기능을 할 여지가 있으나, 궁극적인 해결을 보장하는 법적 장치로써 중복구제의 위험을 제거하기에는 충분하지 않다. 결국 제VI:5조는 중복구제를 방지하는 핵심 원칙을 제공하는 동시에 법적 허점으로도 존재한다. 즉, 본 연구에서 사례를 들어 살펴보았듯이 국내보조금 지급이라는 상황이 덤핑과 동일한 상황에 해당되어 중복구제가 발생할 수 있으며, 수출보조금 지급임에도 불구하고 덤핑과 동일한 상황을 구성하지 않아 병과를 하더라도 중복구제가 발생하지 않을 수 있다. 따라서 제VI:5조는 단순하게 맹목적으로 해석되어서는 안 된다. 중복구제를 방지하고, 또한 중복구제가 아닌 것에 대하여 불필요한 조정을 해주지 않도록 모든 관련 규정을 고려하여 동 조항을 주의 깊게 해석하고 적용하여야 한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Both anti-dumping and countervailing duties were introduced under the GATT/WTO law in order to cope with unfair trade practices. They share a common purpose of protecting a domestic industry from injury due to dumped imports or subsidization. Although anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are not initiated against a single product at the same time in most cases, they have already been applied concurrently, since no explicit provision in any covered agreements prohibits a concurrent application of both duties. Such concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same product could result in what is called a ‘double remedies’. Double remedies, however, do not always arise whenever both remedies are applied simultaneously. Double remedies can be established only when the imposition of these simultaneous duties offsets the same subsidization (or dumping) more than once.
Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 explicitly prohibits double remedies in the same situation of dumping or export subsidization. The underlying rationale of Article VI:5 is that export subsidization only lowers export price, i.e., anti-dumping duty per se offsets the full amount of export subsidy. However, Article VI:5 and other GATT/WTO provisions are silent on the other situation of domestic subsidization. As domestic subsidization generally causes a decrease in the cost of production (COP), it affects both normal value and export price. This may be the reason why the relevant agreements do not separately regulate domestic subsidization as a cause of double remedies. The double remedies issue was not brought to attention both in the international and domestic levels until the US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) case of the WTO dispute settlement, and the series of GPX cases in the US courts. These disputes have illustrated how double remedies can arise from the concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties against a non-market economy country, China. Most of all, they further demonstrate that double remedies could occur in situations other than dumping or export subsidization. Paradoxically, the US’ concurrent application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to China has provided an opportunity to shed new light on Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 and the double remedies issue. Article VI:5 could have easily been limited to its textual and mechanistic interpretations, but now it can be understood more expansively.
The discussions in this study are relevant to double remedies regardless of the market status, i.e., they are commonly applicable to both market and non-market economy countries. The notion that double remedies should be prohibited across all cases is also reinforced by two general principles of law: the principle against double jeopardy, and the principle of proportionality in countermeasure. Although the lesser duty rule may have a limited role in preventing double remedies according to an applied result, it is not enough to guarantee the absence of double remedies. Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 provides not only the key principle for prohibition on double remedies, but also a legal loophole at the same time. It is notable that, on the one hand, double remedies may arise in the situation of ‘domestic subsidization’, but on the other hand, they may not occur in the situation of ‘export subsidization’. Consequently, Article VI:5 should not simply be interpreted blindly. Rather, taking into account of all relevant provisions, it should be carefully interpreted and applied so as to avoid causing double remedies, and to avoid adjusting non-double remedies unnecessarily.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• ABSTRACT i
• LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ix
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi
• CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1
• 1. The Issue of ‘Double Remedies’ 1
• 1) Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties as a Trade Remedy 1
• 2) Concept of ‘Double Remedies’ 4
• 3) The First ‘Double Remedies’ Dispute in the WTO 9
• 2. Purpose and Scope of the Study 12
• CHAPTER II ‘DOUBLE REMEDIES’ UNDER THE GATT/WTO LAW 15
• 1. Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 for Prohibiting ‘Double Remedies’ 15
• 1) General and Critical Interpretations 15
• 2) Article VI:5 in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) 21
• (1) Discussions in the Panel 21
• A. Arguments of the Parties 21
• B. Arguments of the Third Parties 22
• C. Assessment of the Panel 27
• (2) Discussions in the Appellate Body 29
• A. Arguments of the Parties 29
• B. Arguments of the Third Parties 30
• C. Assessment of the Appellate Body 33
• 2. Other Provisions Regulating ‘Double Remedies’ 36
• 1) Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement 37
• (1) Overview 37
• (2) Article 19.3 in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) 40
• A. Arguments and Findings in the Panel 40
• B. Arguments and Findings in the Appellate Body 42
• 2) Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 47
• (1) Overview 47
• (2) Article 19.4 and Article VI:3 in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) 49
• A. Arguments and Findings in the Panel 49
• B. Arguments and Findings in the Appellate Body 52
• 3) Articles 10 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement 53
• (1) Overview 53
• (2) Articles 10 and 32.1 in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) 56
• A. Arguments and Findings in the Panel 56
• B. Arguments and Findings in the Appellate Body 58
• 4) Relevant Provisions of the GATT 1994 and the AD Agreement 60
• 3. Analysis of the Dependence on Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement for Addressing ‘Double Remedies’ 65
• 1) Confusion between Objective and Results of the Concurrent Duties 65
• 2) Ambiguity of the Appropriateness 67
• 3) Other Controversies 68
• 4. Concluding Remarks 70
• CHAPTER III ‘DOUBLE REMEDIES’ IN THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING NON-MARKET ECONOMIES 75
• 1. Treatment of Non-Market Economies in the GATT/WTO 76
• 1) Second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.7 of the AD Agreement 76
• 2) Protocol on the Accession of China to the WTO 79
• 3) Deletion of Article 15 of the Tokyo Round SCM Code 84
• 2. Treatment of Non-Market Economies in the United States 88
• 1) Overview of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Law 88
• 2) Non-Market Economies in Anti-Dumping Investigations 90
• (1) Definition and Designation of Non-Market Economy Country 90
• (2) Non-Market Economy Methodology for Normal Value Calculation 93
• A. Selection of Surrogate Country 95
• B. Normal Value Determined by Factors of Production 97
• 3. Countervailing Duty Investigations and Judicial Decisions of the United States against Non-Market Economies 100
• 1) Non-Application of Countervailing Duties 100
• (1) The First Petition: Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products 100
• (2) The First Negative Determination: Carbon Steel Wire Rod 101
• (3) Negative Determination Again: Potassium Chloride 102
• (4) USCIT Decision: Continental Steel 102
• (5) USCAFC Decision: Georgetown Steel 103
• 2) Policy Change and Judicial Decisions on ‘Double Remedies’ 104
• (1) Policy Change: Coated Free Sheet Paper 104
• (2) Concurrent Investigations: Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires 108
• (3) USCIT Decision: GPX I 111
• (4) USCIT Decision: GPX II 113
• (5) USCIT Decision: GPX III 114
• (6) USCAFC Decision: GPX 2011 115
• 3) New Legislation and Subsequent Legal Challenges 118
• (1) Amendment for Imposing Countervailing Duties against Non-Market Economies without Double Remedies 118
• (2) USCAFC Decision: GPX 2012 127
• (3) A New Request for WTO Consultations by China 129
• 4) Offsetting Double Remedies under the New Legislation 132
• (1) The First Application of the New Law for Implementing the WTO DSB Findings 133
• (2) The First Application of the New Law in the Concurrent Investigations 140
• 4. Concluding Remarks 144
• CHAPTER IV ALTERNATIVE AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO ‘DOUBLE REMEDIES’ 146
• 1. Other Rationales of Prohibiting ‘Double Remedies’ 147
• 1) The Principle against Double Jeopardy 147
• 2) Proportionality as a Limitation on Countermeasures 152
• 3) Applicability of the Lesser Duty Rule 156
• 2. Reconsidering Article VI:5 of the GATT 1994 164
• 1) The Same Situation of Dumping or Domestic Subsidization 166
• (1) Sales below Cost of Production 166
• (2) Upstream Subsidy to the Affiliated Company 168
• 2) The Different Situation of Dumping or Export Subsidization 170
• 3. Practical Approaches to ‘Double Remedies’ Adjustment Methodology 172
• 1) Adjustment for Export Subsidization 173
• 2) Adjustment for Domestic Subsidization 176
• 4. Concluding Remarks 177
• CHAPTER V CONCLUSION 179
• BIBLIOGRAPHY 181
• 국 문 초 록 199