신호게임모형을 활용한 정당연합 형성에 대한 분석 : 민주화 이후 한국 대통령 선거를 중심으로 = A Study on Analysis of Political Coalition Formation by Using Signaling Game Model : Focusing on Presidential Elections in South Korea after its Democratization

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Coalition between political parties has been a constant prior to presidential election in Korean political scene, which is exemplified by the DJP coalition in the 15th presidential election, the single candidacy agreement between Moo-hyun Roh and Mong-jun Jeong in the 16th presidential election, and activities for "consolidation" of the opposition parties ahead of the presidential election in 2012. However, the political coalition to seize power appears generally in a multi-party system country that has adopted the parliamentary system. Therefore, relevant studies have been conducted based on the basic premise of such political system. The purpose of this paper is to suggest and explain the analysis model for political coalition in Korea that appears in pursuit of presidential election victory or "indivisible" power. Under what conditions do political parties get united for coalition prior to presidential election and what are the major factors to political coalition? Is it possible that such political coalition will last even after presidential election? In this study, signaling game model is used to analyze mechanism of political coalition that appears for the "single candidacy game" (or political coalition) in the run-up to presidential election. In the game model suggested in this paper, major variables were winning odds in presidential election and share distribution (promised to be distributed in return for victory). And the equilibrium was examined in formation of political coalition. The concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the signaling game model enables modeling of not only difference in information between actors but also uncertain information commonly given to all of the actors. According to the analysis results of the game, the equilibrium was not established when separation strategy was used to "change the shares that were supposed to be given to political parties in coalition depending on winning odds in presidential election." On the contrary, it was found that the equilibrium was established only when common strategy was used to "guarantee a certain amount of share regardless of winning odds in presidential election." This result suggests critical implications to understand the previous cases of political coalition in Korean presidential election and to predict "coalition of the opposition parties" in the upcoming 2012 presidential election.
Configuration of this paper is as follows. The second chapter is Analyses of the preceding study and a limitation. The third chapter is a main analysis mold of this paper, explain a basic mold of the game model. In this chapter, set up a hypothesis for configuration of a game model and assumption, give shape to a necessary element to signal game. In the forth chapter, I will account for approach of separating strategy and pooling strategy. A conceptual of perfect bayesian equilibrium will be used an answer of a game. The Fifth chapter is a conclusion.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장. 서론 = 1
• 제2장. 정당연합에 대한 기존 연구 및 한계 = 4
• 제1절. 정당연합에 대한 선행 연구 = 4
• 제2절. 선행 연구의 한계 및 문제점 = 13
• 제3절. 신호게임(Signaling game)모형 = 18
• 제3장. 게임이론을 활용한 정당연합모형 = 20
• 제1절. 게임모형 구성 = 20
• 1) 게임의 가설 = 21
• 2) 게임의 가정 = 21
• 제2절. 신호게임 모형과 행위자의 선호 = 23
• 제3절. 합리적 전략을 통한 접근 = 29
• 제4절. 신뢰구축 전략을 통한 접근 = 34
• 제4장. 게임모형을 통한 분석 = 41
• 제1절. 합리적 전략을 통한 분석 = 41
• 제2절. 신뢰구축 전략을 통한 분석 = 46
• 제5장. 결론 = 54
• 참고문헌 = 57
• Abstract = 59