This study investigated the effects of the auditor designation on real activity earnings management. The auditor designation system was adopted as part of the efforts to supplement the free audit engagement system and increase the reliability of the a...
This study investigated the effects of the auditor designation on real activity earnings management. The auditor designation system was adopted as part of the efforts to supplement the free audit engagement system and increase the reliability of the accounting information produced by a designated firm and has been expanding its scope of application.
The previous studies on the validity of the auditor designation system usually tested how discretionary accruals were changed during the period when the designated auditors performed auditing jobs. However, it should be taken into account whether manager can use both accruals and cash from operations as the sources of earnings management in order to confirm the effects of the system on earnings management.
Thus I divided the means of earnings management into discretionary accrual(DA) and real activity earnings management(RM) and examined how a designated company would be different in the level of each earning management from a non-designated company and how each earning management level would be changed during the designation period compared to before the period. I also investigated whether DA was replaced by RM due to a designated auditor.
The research findings were as follows: first, the companies with a designated auditor showed a significantly lower level of DA than those with no designated auditor, which is because the managers of the former control the DA level to a significant degree since a designated auditor is relatively more likely to detect DA than other types of auditors. The designated companies also had significantly lower abnormal operating cash flows than the non-designated ones even though RM was different according to the components, which implies that a designated auditor can have impacts on certain elements of RM.
Second, the designated companies made an upward adjustment on their profits with DA and a downward adjustment on their profits with RM during the designated period compared to before the period. When a designated period was divided further, it was found that the designated companies intentionally lowered the DA level to a significant degree right before designation, which means that a designated auditor does have preventive effects on discretionary accruals. When the size of designated auditors was small, the DA level of the organization significantly increased during the designated period compared to before the period, which suggests that designated auditors may have different influences on DA according to their sizes. Some of the component items of RM were significantly decreased during the designated period compared to before the period because there is a possibility of some of RM's component items being prevented or detected by a designated auditor and the implementation costs of RM, which cause damage to corporate value, are multiplied by the designated companies' financial difficulties.
Third, it was confirmed that DA and RM were used together instead of earnings management being replaced during the designated period, which finding was different from some previous studies overseas that reported the replacement relations between DA and RM were manifested by the regulation authorities or reinforced legal accountability. The finding suggests that such regulations as the auditor designation system cannot restrict the simultaneous usage of earning management by designated companies in a financial crisis.
This study makes the following contributions: first, I analyzed a recent sample period from 2001 to 2010 and thus reflected the recent trends in auditor designation.
Second, the previous studies on the auditor designation system only addressed earnings management through discretionary accruals to examine the effects of its introduction and changes on auditing quality. Unlike them, this study checked how real activity earnings management was changing along with discretionary accruals by the system.
Third, this study showed that abnormal operating cash flows(Ab_CFO) of the components of RM were significantly controlled by a designated auditor unlike the previous studies that found no big connections between RM and the possibility of detection by the regulation authorities or auditors. The results suggest that designated auditors of high independence can preventively reduce RM or point out some of it in an effort to lower auditing risks. The study also confirmed negative relationships between the size of auditors, which substitutes auditing quality, and RM and further found that RM usage could be restricted by stakeholders by proving negative connections between foreign investment ratio and RM.
Fourth, the study also showed that the components of RM could cause differences to the possibility of detection by the regulation authorities and the effects on future corporate value and confirmed that some of the items such as the R&D expenses and advertisement and promotion costs of abnormal discretionary expenses(Ab_DisExp) were used to make an upward adjustment on profits even before the designated period.
Finally, the results of this study provide implications about the validity of the auditor designation system and what should be done to supplement the system. The fact that the DA level of a designated company is significantly lower than that of a non-designated company and that the DA control level is significant in the year right before designation proves the validity of the auditor designation system. It was also confirmed that the high independence level of designated auditors controlled the abnormal operating cash flows of RM to some degree. On the other hand, the smaller the size of designated auditors was, the more significant increase DA made compared to pre-designation.
In short, the regulation authorities should make consistent efforts to ensure that the auditor designation system will perform the right auditing functions on designated companies such as expanding the scope of its application currently under consideration and improving the selection method of designated auditors in order for them to maintain more independence and competence. Designated auditors should try not to pay attention only to the earnings management for one party, instead, make efforts to lower the detection risks on earnings management by taking into account many different means of earnings management and their relations at the same time.