This research comparatively examines the background to, events of, and methods of resolution employed in the Cold War Era’s greatest nuclear crisis, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and post-Cold War Era’s most defining nuclear crisis, the first Nor...
This research comparatively examines the background to, events of, and methods of resolution employed in the Cold War Era’s greatest nuclear crisis, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and post-Cold War Era’s most defining nuclear crisis, the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-1994. Through this study, new insights are sought into means of resolving the North Korean nuclear issues that have re-emerged since October 2002.
In order to compare the two crises, first, the focus was laid on the United States, and the two issues were newly redefined as the representative Cold War- and post-Cold War nuclear crises. If the Cuban missile crisis stemmed from the United States’ Cold War Era security strategy of containment, the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted as a result of the United States’ post-Cold War security strategy centered on preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Next, the North Korean nuclear issue was divided into the 1st crisis (1993-1994), and the ongoing 2nd crisis (October 2002-present). As the second crisis in still ongoing, the first crisis was chosen for comparison in this study.
Based on this, in Chapter II, myriad existing research on the background, unfolding, and detained contents of the final agreement of the Cuban missile crisis were compiled and organized. In Chapter III, existing research covering the background, unfolding, and final negotiations of the first North Korean missile crisis are likewise compiled and organized. In Chapter Ⅳ, the similarities and differences of the two crises were determined, and the determining factors behind the reason the Cuban crisis could be conclusively resolved while the North Korean crisis re-emerged were sought.
There were many similarities. That both centered on nuclear weaponry, that the United States was an actor in both, and that the cause of both crises was rooted in the threat perception harbored by a small and weak nation with hostile relations with the United States can be said to be the key similarities. That efforts to strengthen one’s national security actually sharply destabilized one’s situation, that both arose at a time when there was a U.S. government led by the Democratic Party and a very young president, that the United States employed coercive tactics in the opening stage, then negotiation in the eleventh hour, and that a peaceful resolution was found just as the brink of war had been reached are also commonalities shared by these two crises.
Dissimilarities are also clear. During the Cuban crisis, the United States leadership employed the emergency council structure almost routinely. However, during the North Korean crisis, ministerial and vice-ministerial talks were employed as if in a crisis situation. Inversely proportional to this difference in the sense of crisis was that the Cuban missile crisis was resolved after only thirteen days of a two-player game between the United States and the Soviet Union, while the North Korean nuclear crisis stretched over 588 days and was a multi-player game with the participation of not only the United States and North Korea, but also South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the IAEA.
Ultimately, the Cuban missile crisis was resolved through security considerations including the withdrawal of nuclear weapons in return for a promise not to attack Cuba and a withdrawal of U.S. missiles deployed in Turkey. However, resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis was centered on economic compensation in the form of two light-water reactors. Despite the fact that both crises were born of a small and weak country’s security concerns, the Cuban missile crisis was resolved though the exchange of concrete security agreements that reduced instability, while the North Korean crisis only temporarily contained the crisis through economic compensation. If specific reciprocity was carried out during the Cuban missile crisis, diffuse reciprocity was sought in resolving the North Korean crisis, and it failed.
To conclude, in order to resolve the ongoing second North Korean nuclear crisis, an alternative approach based on security guarantees that can ease security concerns needs to be prepared, and this needs to be done through specific reciprocity. In addition, the provision of light water reactors, aid, and other economic compensation needs to be seen as a supporting means that will supplement this specific reciprocity.