A Study on North Korea's Strategy in Nuclear Disputes: The Struggle for Survival of a Small Power : A Study on North Korea's Strategy in Nuclear Disputes: The Struggle for Survival of a Small Power

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The purpose of this study is to investigate North Korea’s main motivations for developing nuclear weapons. The findings will be helpful in analyzing North Korea’s ways or strategy to deal with the United States in the first and second nuclear dispute and also be helpful to formulate appropriate policy to solve the problem. In order to achieve the purpose, the theories and conceptual frameworks about why states develop nuclear weapons and small powers’ behavior in the international politics will be employed.
This study finds that North Korea has been threatened by the U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons since the Korean War. In addition, North Korea, after the end of Cold War, also experienced security and economic problems that posed negative impacts on its survival. North Korea has attempted to solve these problems, but it only could reach reconciliation with South Korea by concluding the Basic Agreement in 1991. But North Korea could not open talks with the United States and also could not solve the problem with Japan.
When the first nuclear dispute occurred, North Korea was able to bargain with the IAEA to conclude the safeguards agreement in case of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons withdrawal from South Korea. North Korea also could hold bilateral talks with the United States in which both sides signed the Agreed Framework in 1994 in order to solve the nuclear problem. North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for gaining security assurances and establishing economic and political ties with the United States.
After the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 and the six-party talks were created to solve the second nuclear dispute, North Korea still desired to use nuclear weapons program as a bargaining chip. But its motivations began to use nuclear weapons as deterrent against the U.S. threat after its conducting nuclear test on October 9, 2006. However, North Korea declared that it still desires to dismantle the nuclear weapons program in exchange for gaining security assurances and economic and political ties from the United States.
The study indicates that North Korea used brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy as strategy in both nuclear disputes. But in the second nuclear dispute its strategy could not reach a desired outcome when compared with the first. The main reason is that the Bush administration has pursued a hard-line policy toward North Korea. In terms of scholarly contribution, in a case on North Korea nuclear proliferation, this study discovers that a small power could use nuclear weapons as a leverage to bargain with the United States, a great power, during the first nuclear crisis. In order to solve the North Korea’s nuclear problem, it is necessary to pay more attention to North Korea’s motivations to go nuclear. Therefore, the United States should formulate policies to solve the problems in which North Korea has been concerned about its survival, especially those about America’s threats and sanctions.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Chapter One INRODUCTION = 1
• 1. The Research Question = 1
• 1.1 The Emergence of North Korea’s Nuclear Disputes = 1
• 1.2 Rational for the Study = 6
• 2. The Purpose of the Study = 14
• 3. Methods of the Study = 15
• 4. The Organization of the Study = 16
• Chapter Two THEORETICAL BACKGROUND = 18
• 1. Why States Develop Nuclear Weapons = 18
• 1.1 Security and Deterrence Motivation = 22
• 1.2 Bargaining and Political Leverage Motivation = 34
• 1.3 Political Motivation = 35
• 1.4 State Prestige and Identity Motivation = 37
• 2. Small Powers’ Behavior in International Politics = 39
• 2.1 How Can Small Powers Survive in the International Politics? = 42
• 2.1.1 Pursuing Neutrality or Nonalignment = 44
• 2.1.2 Forming Alliances = 45
• 2.2 Small Powers’ Behavior Related to Developing Nuclear Weapons = 48
• 2.3 How Do Small Powers Bargain on Great Power? = 49
• 3. Hypotheses of the Study = 50
• Chapter Three NORTH KOREA’S SITUATIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR AS A BACKGROUND OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT = 52
• 1. The Imbalance of Power on the Korean Peninsula = 52
• 1.1 Strategic Changes = 53
• 1.2 North Korea’s Military Vulnerability = 58
• 1.2.1 American Nuclear Threat = 66
• 1.2.2 South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program = 69
• 2. North Korea’s Economic Problems = 71
• 2.1 Loss of Trading Partners = 73
• 2.2 The Food Crisis = 79
• 3. Political Uncertainties = 81
• 3.1 Political Leadership Change = 82
• 3.2 Rearrangement of Political Structure = 86
• 4. North Korea’s Attempts to Settle Undesired Situations = 87
• 4.1 Pursuing Reconciliation with South Korea = 88
• 4.2 Attempts to Resolve Problems with the United States and Japan = 90
• 4.3 Embarking on Economic Reform = 93
• 4.3.1 Launching Economic Zone and Limited Reform = 93
• 4.3.2 Pursuing Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation = 96
• Chapter Four THE FIRST NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR DISPUTE = 100
• 1. The Background of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program = 100
• 2. North Korea’s Motivations in the First Nuclear Dispute = 103
• 2.1 Bargaining for the U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Withdrawal = 103
• 2.2 Escalating Dispute with the IAEA Aimed to Hold Direct Talks with the United States = 104
• 3. North Korea’s Target: Holding Intensive Direct Talks with the United States = 106
• 4. North Korea’s Strategy in Nuclear Negotiations = 109
• 5. Gaining Security Assurances and Economic and Political Benefits = 116
• 6. The Agreed Framework: The Outcome of North Korea’s Nuclear Motivations = 119
• 7. The Implementation of the Agreed Framework = 122
• 8. Evaluation = 128
• Chapter Five THE SECOND NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR DISPUTE = 130
• 1. The Collapse of the Agreed Framework = 130
• 2. North Korea’s Motivations in the Second Nuclear Dispute = 138
• 3. North Korea’s Target = 139
• 4. North Korea’s Strategy = 141
• 4.1 Employing Brinkmanship and Crisis Diplomacy = 141
• 4.2 Launching Missile Test = 144
• 4.3 Conducting Nuclear Test = 147
• 5. The U.S. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Dispute = 155
• 6. The Outcome of the Six-Party Talks = 159
• 7. Evaluation = 161
• Chapter Six COMPARISON OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR DISPUTE = 165
• 1. North Korea’s Motivations = 165
• 2. North Korea’s Target = 166
• 3. North Korea’s Strategy = 167
• 3.1 Escalating the Situation = 169
• 3.2 Staling the Talks = 175
• 3.3 Threats to Possess, Transfer and Conduct Nuclear = Test182
• 3.4 Crossing the Red Line by Conducting Missile and Nuclear Test = 186
• 4. The Outcomes of the First and Second Nuclear Dispute = 191
• Chapter Seven NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A MEANS FOR NORTH KOREA’S SURVIVAL = 196
• 1. Gaining Security Assurances as a Means to Cope with Security Threats = 197
• 2. Establishing Economic and Political Ties as a Means to Address Economic Problems = 204
• 3. North Korea’s Main Motivations to Develop Nuclear Weapons = 214
• Chapter Eight CONCLUSION = 223
• BIBLIOGRAPHY = 231