APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL MODEL WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA

국문 초록 (Abstract)

유럽 군비통제 모델의 한반도에 적용 o 논문의 기본방향은 냉전기간 중 유럽의 재래식무기 군비통제 협상 모델을 남.북한 군비 통제에 적용 가능성을 판단하고, 유럽의 협상 교훈들을 도출을 통해서 남.북한 군비통제에 적용시킬 수 있는 방안을 제시하는 것이었음. ㅇ 논문의 기본구성은 유럽의 재래식 무기 군비통제 협상의 틀(framework)로서 유럽의 신뢰 구축과 군비감축 협상과정을 분석하면서, 특히 냉전시대의 분단국가로서 남.북한 안보상황과 유사한 동.서독 안보상황을 접목하여 협상의 이슈와 협상과정을 분석하였음. ㅇ 이러한 유럽의 군비통제 방식을 남.북한 여러 가지 군비통제 협상에 대비시키면서 주변국가들의 남.북한 군비통제와 협상에 대한 기본태도와 인식을 살펴보고, 남.북한이 제안한 정치. 군사회담을 분석하였음. ㅇ 또한 남.북한 정치.군사회담 및 군비통제 제안내용들에 대한 접근방식을 분석하고, 협상형태, 신뢰구축, 군비감축, 비핵선언등을 구체적으로 비교하면서 문제점들을 제시하였음. ㅇ 유럽의 군비통제 협상의 7가지 교훈이 남.북한 군비통제 협상에 그대로 적용될 수 있다는것을 예시하고, 남.북한의 협상 제안내용들은 NATO와 Warsaw Pact, 미국과 소련, 동.서독이 제안하는 내용과 공통된 요소들을 제시하였음. ㅇ 결론적으로 유럽의 협상과정에서 얻어진 교훈과 제안내용들은 남.북한 비무장 지대에서의 신뢰구축과 군비감축협상을 동시에 적용시킬 수 방안들을 발견하고, 동독(East Germany)에 대한 서독(West Germany)의 화해와 군비통제 정책들이 한반도에 그대로 적용될 수 있다는 것을을 시험한 것이었음.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The objective of this thesis is to design a Korean arms control model through the application of the European arms control models to the Korean Peninsula. In order to construct a theoretical framework for such an application it is necessary to introduce four sub-objectives. The first is to find the overall utilities of arms control as an element of security policy and technical guides for the application through analysis of processes, targets, outcomes and impacts of the European arms control framework; CSCE, CBMs, MBFR and CFE. The second examines the particular points of German arms control policies as a divided state and position on the front-line of the European Cold War theatre in the multilateral arms control politics with a view to considering its relevance to the Korean situation. In light of its geopolitical significance and the major powers' deep involvement in the Korean Peninsula the third is to explore the regional security environmental conditions conducive to Korean arms control in the framework of the European models. The final part of the thesis examines the potential conditions for the application and suggests the most suitable arms control measures and priority of application on the basis of the regional and Korean security situations. In exploring these issues, emphasis is placed upon a historical approach and an analytical description and focussed on the substantiation of the 7 questions addressed in the conclusion.
Firstly, the thesis argues that the European conventional arms control model constitute a universal security formula between actual and potential enemies beyond Europe. Given the similarities of security situations and arms control approaches and proposals in particular, and the same expectation and prediction of the results between the two regions, Korean arms control is the most suitable case for small-scale application of the European model. In the collective arms control talks, the German arms control policies, which required the separation of arms control and unification problem on the basis of the co-existence the divided states and political stability as a means of overcoming security problems of front-line of the Cold War, present the most suitable alternative for the Korean arms control. The arms control dialogues and proposals which reflected the security problem of the front-line between the two German states or their parties are the most appropriate measures applicable to the Korean security problem.
The other contention of the thesis is that as a condition of a regional environment conducive to Korean arms control, the establishment of multilateral security conference and arms control mechanisms in Northeast Asia is needed for the management of the high level regional forces and potential conflicts between the rival powers. The presence of the U.S. is essential for regional stability with its security guarantee for a Korea faced with potential threats from the neighbouring powers and with its buffer role for ensuring stability between the North and the South. The establishment of North-South authentic denuclearization through the abandonment of security dependence upon nuclear weapons is an essential pre-condition for the success of conventional arms control. The denuclearization can be achieved through the maintenance of a balance of conventional forces at a low level because both sides depend upon the nuclear element as a means of the complementary function countering vulnerability of the respective conventional defence.
Finally the thesis demonstrates that the removal of the North-South deep-rooted distrust and threat perception is the first agenda for arms control. In the light of the Korean security situation the European CBMs should be applied firstly for tension reduction, the prevention of surprise attack and accidental war, putting emphasis on transparency of military activities. As an alternative for these a phased zonal arms control with the application of CBMs and thinning of dense forward deployed forces could be gradually applied in the DMZ and the forward area between Seoul and Pyongyang, accumulating arms control experience and reducing its psychological and physical impact. First of all, one of the most precious lessons from the European arms control experience the continuation of institutionalized arms control talks which should encourage detente and political stability on the Korean Peninsula.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• ABSTRACT
• TABLE OF CONTENTS = ⅱ
• CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION = 3
• 1. Background of Application of European Arms Control to Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula = 3
• 2. Purpose and Method of the Research = 5
• 3. The Analytical Framework of the Research = 7
• CHAPTER 2: THE REVIEW OF DEBATES ON ARMS CONTROL = 10
• 1. The Meaning of Disarmament = 10
• 2 .The Concept and Purpose of Arms Control = 13
• 2.1. Nuclear Forces = 13
• 2.2. Conventional Forces = 15
• 2.3. The Linkage of Nuclear and Conventional Control = 19
• 3. Spin-offs and Drawbacks of Arms Control = 21
• 3.1. Spin-off effects = 21
• 3.2. Drawback Effects = 25
• 4. The Conditions and Obstacles of Arms Control = 28
• 4.1 The Conditions for Arms Control = 28
• 4.2 Obstacles to Arms Control = 31
• Conclusion = 34
• CHAPTER 3: THE CSCE AND CBMs IN EUROPE = 40
• 1. CSCE and Arms Control = 40
• 1.1. CSCE and Political Stability = 40
• 1.2. CSCE and the German Question = 42
• 1.3. CSCE and Confidence Building Measures = 44
• 2. The Conceptual Framework of CBMs = 46
• 2.1. The Concept of CBMs = 46
• 2.2. The Objectives and Roles of CBMs = 47
• 2.3. The Relationship between CSBMs and Arms Reduction = 49
• 3. The Applications and Implementation of CBMs = 51
• 3.1. Development of CBMs: from Helsinki to Vienna = 51
• 3.2 The Applications of CBMs = 53
• 3.3. Results of the CBMs Implications = 57
• 3.4. Criticisms and Lessons = 59
• 4. Applications of the European CBMs Model Elsewhere = 62
• 4.1. Transferring the European CBMs to Other Regions = 62
• 4.2. Success of CBMs in the Sinai = 63
• 4.3. CBMs of the Contadora Treaty in Central America = 65
• Conclusion = 68
• CHAPTER 4: THE ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS: MBFR AND CFE = 73
• 1. The Process of MBFR Talks = 73
• 1.1. The Origins of MBFR = 73
• 1.2. The Process and Issues of MBFR Talks = 76
• 2. The Problems and Obstacles of MBFR Talks = 82
• 2.1. The Lack of Political Will = 82
• 2.2. Problems of the Negotiating Agenda = 84
• 2.3. Data Dispute = 85
• 2.4. Verification = 87
• 3. The Process and Issues of the CFE Talks = 88
• 3.1. From MBFR to CFE = 88
• 3.2. The Mandate for CFE = 90
• 3.3. Issues in the CFE Talk Process = 92
• 4. The Implications and Impacts of the CFE Treaty = 94
• 4.1. The Main Treaty Implications = 94
• 4.2. The Results and Impact of the Treaty = 97
• 4.3. The Lessons from the CFE Talks = 100
• Conclusion = 103
• CHAPTER 5: THE FRG'S CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL POLICY AS A DIVIDED STATE = 108
• 1. Factors Influencing Arms Control Policy Making = 108
• 1.1. Geostrategic Position as a Pillar of NATO = 108
• 1.2. Arms Control as a Security Policy = 109
• 1.3. German Unification and Arms Control = 111
• 1.4. Institutional Adaptation and Decision Making Processes = 112
• 2. Policy-making for Arms Control as a Piltar af NATO = 115
• 2.1. Development of Arms Control Policy = 115
• 2.2. Threat Perception From WTO = 117
• 2.3. The Recognition of Military Balance = 119
• 3. The Positions in the Conventional Arms Control Talks = 120
• 3.1. Basic Approach to Arms Control = 120
• 3.2. German Positions on the CSCE and CBMs = 121
• 3.3. The Position on Conventional Arms Reduction Talks = 124
• 4. Arms control dialogues between the FRG and GDR = 131
• 4.1 The GDR's Positions on Arms Control = 131
• 4.2. Development of the FRG-GDR Arms Control Dialogue = 133
• 4.3. Dialogues between SPD and the SED = 134
• Conclusion = 139
• CHAPTER 6: THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR KOREAN ARMS CONTROL = 145
• 1. Regional Strategic Environment = 145
• 1.1. The Arms Control Links between Northeast Asia and Europe = 145
• 1.2. The Dynamics of the Major Powers' Strategic Relations = 147
• 1.3. Regional Military Balance = 151
• 2. The Territorial Disputes = 154
• 2.1. The Northern Territories Problem = 155
• 2.2. The China-Japan Dispute = 157
• 3. The Application of Arms Control Along the Sino-Russia Border = 158
• 4. The Applicability of European Arms Control to Northeast Asia = 162
• 4.1. Perspectives and Proposals of Regional Powers = 162
• 4.2. The Potentiality for the European Arms Control Models Aplication = 178
• Conclusion = 186
• CHAPTER 7: REGIONAL STABILITY AND KOREAN ARMS CONTROL = 192
• 1. U.S. Forces Stationed in Korea and Korean Arms Control = 192
• 1.1. The USFK and Korean Security in Regional Politics = 192
• 1.2. The USFK and North-South Arms Control Talks = 194
• 2. The Regional Powers' Security Assistance to Korea = 196
• 2.1. The Soviet Union, China and North Korea = 196
• 2.2. The United States and South Korea = 199
• 3. The Military Confrontation of North and South Korea = 202
• 3.1. The Comparison of the Military Strengths = 202
• 3.2. The Surprise Attack Capability = 206
• 3.3. Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula = 212
• 4. The Regional Powers' Arms Control Policies towards the Korean Peninsula = 214
• 4.1. Status Quo and War Deterrence Policies = 214
• 4.2. Implications of the European Arms Control Model = 218
• Conclusion = 225
• CHAPTER 8: THE NORTH-SOUTH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS = 232
• 1. The History of Arms Control Talks = 232
• 2. Arms Control Approaches = 236
• 2.1. North Korea = 236
• 2.2. South Korea = 238
• 3. Current Issues and Proposals = 240
• 3.1. Negotiation Forum = 240
• 3.2. Confidence Building Measures = 242
• 3.3. Arms Reduction = 246
• 3.4. Denuclearization = 251
• Conclusion = 255
• CHAPTER 9: The KOREAN ARMS CONTROL AND THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL MODEL = 260
• 1. Relevance of European Arms Control to Korea = 260
• 1.1. The Korean Peninsula's Parallels with Europe in the Cold War = 260
• 1.2. Korean Perspectives on European Arms Control = 262
• 2. Applicability of European Arms Control Models = 267
• 2.1. The Potential Conditions for Application = 267
• 2.2. Lessons Learnt from the European Experiences = 269
• 2.3. Lessons Learnt from German Arms Control Policies = 278
• 3. Priorities for the Model Application = 282
• 3.1. The Elimination of the Perceived Threat = 282
• 3.2. Prevention of Surprise Attack = 284
• 3.3. Creation of Crisis Management Centre = 289
• 3.4. A linkage of the Korean Arms Control and USFK = 292
• 3.5. The True Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula = 296
• Conclusion = 300
• CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION = 307
• SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY = 324