WEAKER STATES, RISK-TAKING AND FOREIGN POLICY : RETHINKING NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR POLICY, 1989-2005

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Weaker States, Risk Taking, and Foreign Policy: Rethinking North Korea's Nuclear Policy, 1989-2005 (약소국의 위험수용과 외교정책: 북한의 핵 정책 연구, 1989-2005) 국제정치학에서 약소국의 행동방식에 대한 전통적인 견해는 자신들보다 더 강한 국가들에 도전하지 않는다는 것인데, 그것은 약소국들이 패배할 가능성이 높은 전쟁을 기피하려고 하기 때문이다. 그러나, 약소국들이 불리한 세력균형의 상황에서도 강대국들에 도전한 역사적 사례가 많이 존재하는데, 본 논문은 그러한 이례적인 상황이 발생하는 원인과 과정에 대해서 연구한다. 본 논문은 국제정치학에서 최근 발전되고 있는 전망이론(prospect theory)과 국내-국제 이중게임(two-level games)의 주장들을 발전시켜, 약소국, 특히 소위 불량국가(rogue regime)라고 불리어지는 국가들의 외교정책을 설명한다. 먼저, 약소국의 외교정책 행동방식에 대한 새로운 이론적 가설들을 제시한 후, 이 가설들을 탈냉전 시대 북한의 핵 정책 사례에 적용하여 설명한다. 본 연구의 주요한 목적은 탈냉전 시기 초기에 북한이 핵무기 프로그램을 시작하면서 미국과의 충돌국면을 시작하게 된 경위와, 이후 그들의 핵 정책이 충돌과 협력 사이에서 변화하게 되는 원인을 밝힌다. 마지막으로 본 연구의 북한 핵 정책 변화 설명이 가지는 정책적 함의를 제시하고, 나아가 다른 불량국가들의 행동방식을 설명하는데 어떻게 유용하게 사용되는지를 구명한다. 본 연구는 기존의 북한 핵 정책 연구가 국제정치학의 주요한 두가지 이론적 흐름인 현실주의와 자유주의적 접근법에 크게 의존했음에도 불구하고, 현실적으로 북한의 행동변화에 대한 설득력 있는 설명을 제시하지 못한 점을 비판하고, 전망이론과 국내-국제 이중게임을 발전시켜 세가지 가설을 제시한다. 첫째, 국제정치의 장에서 북한의 외부적 위치가 악화되어가고 있다고 북한의 지도자들이 인식할 때, 그들은 북한의 대외적 상황을 손실의 영역(domain of losses)에 있다고 규정짓게 되어, 현상유지를 위해 행동방식이 위험 수용적으로 변하고 결과적으로 더 모험적인 핵 정책을 선택하게 된다. 이것은 전망이론이 설명하는 것처럼 국가들은 이득(gains)보다는 손실(losses)에 더 민감하게 반응하기 때문이다. 둘째, 그러나, 자신들의 모험적인 핵 정책으로 인해 미국과의 군사적 충돌이 임박했다고 북한의 지도자들이 인식한다면, 그들의 영역은 극단적 손실의 영역(domain of extreme losses)으로 옮겨가게 되어서 그들의 행동 방식은 위험 회피적이 될 가능성이 많으며, 결과적으로 극단적인 재난을 피하기 위해 모험적인 정책을 취할 가능성은 낮아진다. 이것은 극단적인 상황에서는 국가들의 행동방식이 달라지게 되기 때문이다. 마지막으로, 북한의 국내적 상황이 북한의 지도자들의 인식에 큰 영향을 미치는데, 북한의 국내적 상황이 자신들의 체제를 위협할 정도까지 악화된다고 인식할 때는 국내적 현상유지를 위해 대외적으로 훨씬 더 위험 수용적인 모습을 보이며, 모험적인 핵 정책을 선택할 가능성이 높아지게 된다. 결과적으로 국내정치가 체제 생존을 위협할 정도로 악화되는 상황에서는 북한의 핵 정책이 국내정치적 상황에 영향을 받을 가능성이 높다. 그러나, 국내 정치적 상황이 지속가능한 상황일 경우에는 상대적으로 국제정치의 영향, 특히 미국의 대북 정책에 대한 북한 지도자들의 인식이 북한의 대미 핵 정책에 더 큰 영향을 미칠 것이다. 본 논문의 이러한 가설들은 냉전의 종식이후 진행된 두 차례의 북한 핵 위기 시기동안 발견되며, 이 기간동안 북한의 지도자들은 그들의 대내외적 상황에 대한 인식에 따라, 위험 회피적이거나 위험 수용적인 경향을 보여주었으며, 이러한 경향이 충돌과 협력 사이에서 변화하는 북한의 핵 정책을 잘 설명해 준다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Why did weaker North Korea initially choose to take the risk of standing up against the much stronger U.S. with its nuclear weapons program, even escalating the crisis to the point of risking a war rather than engage the U.S. from the beginning?
Then, why did North Korea change its course of action in the midst of the crisis even though the initial security environment that led to the nuclear weapons program remained essentially the same?
First of all, in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War, North Korean leaders perceived the North's status quo to be deteriorating on the Korean peninsula, so they began to frame their external situation in the domain of losses, became risk-acceptant, and confronted the U.S., taking a more risky foreign policy option in an attempt to restore the status quo.
Second, in June 1994, North Korean leaders began to feel that a U.S. military strike on North Korea might be imminent, and in the military confrontation with the U.S., their domain of action suddenly shifted from loss to extreme loss. Because military conflict with the U.S. would probably lead to the end of the North Korean regime, North Korean leaders became risk-averse and sought to avoid the certainly catastrophic outcome of war. If North Korean leaders perceived a serious threat to regime survival from domestic politics in the early 1990s and believed at the time that the domestic regime could not be sustained, they might have become highly risk-acceptant and might have sought to externalize the domestic discontent in the mindset of "double-or-nothing." However, because they perceived that the regime was strong enough to manage the domestic issues, they did not choose to lash out in June 1994 but instead tried to resolve the crisis when they saw the international situation becoming extremely worse.
Third, during the second half of the 1990s after the nuclear deal with the U.S. in 1994, North Korean leaders perceived that Pyongyang's status quo in international politics was improving. As North Korean leaders perceived that their domain of action was moving toward gain, they began to show risk-averse foreign policy attitude and sought to engage the U.S. in an attempt to avoid loss and improve the status quo. On the other hand, because North Korea's domestic situation went from bad to worse due to the food crisis, North Korean leaders might have become more willing to adopt a risky foreign policy. However, they did not become risk-acceptant in an attempt to externalize domestic unrest, but rather decided to use the improving international situation and restore the status quo of domestic politics because the regime was still sustainable enough to muddle through the domestic crisis.
Fourth, after the Bush administration took office and continued a hard-line policy toward North Korea, North Korean leaders began to perceive the international situation as deteriorating. North Korea was also losing patience regarding America's unwillingness to fulfill the Agreed Framework. After the Bush administration revealed the North's new covert nuclear program in October 2002 and renounced the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang's domain of action finally returned to losses. In the newly established losing situation, North Korean leaders began to demonstrate their risk-acceptant attitude again and resumed the confrontation with an aggressive nuclear policy in an effort to restore their external status quo. On the other hand, the North avoided a worst-case domestic scenario of the second half of the 1990s, and its domestic situation did not strongly influence foreign policy decision making.
Table 6-1 is a summary of North Korean leaders' domain of action and foreign policy risk-taking attitudes. North Korea was initially situated in cell 2 and showed risk-acceptant foreign policy attitude during the first half of the 1990s, but its situation moved to cell 3 in June 1994 and changed its attitude to risk-averse. During the second half of the 1990s, North Korea's situation might have moved to cell 4 if its domestic situation had become worse to the point of being unsustainable, but because the North's domestic politics did not collapse and also because the regime used the improving external relations to resolve the domestic situation, Pyongyang's domain of action moved to cell 1 in the second half of the 1990s. However, in the early 2000s after the Bush administration took office, Pyongyang's situation was shifting between cell 1 and cell 2 and finally moved into cell 2 again after October 2002.
◁표 삽입▷(원문을 참조하세요)
Finally, Table 6-2 summarizes Pyongyang's nuclear policy depending on its domain of action in six periods throughout the North Korean crisis. This table demonstrates that when North Korea was situated in the domain of loss, it became risk-acceptant and showed confrontational policy regarding its nuclear program like the periods of pre-June 1994 and post-October 2002. Conversely, when North Korea's domain of action was moving toward gain during the Clinton administration, it became risk-averse and showed conciliatory engagement policy. It also shows how Pyongyang's nuclear policy shifted from one to the other when its domain of action shifted from one to the other as in June 1994 and October 2002.
◁표 삽입▷(원문을 참조하세요)

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION = 2
• Purpose and Motivation = 5
• Research Puzzles Proposed = 6
• Definition of Risk = 10
• Outline of Dissertation = 11
• CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK : PROSPECT THEORY, WEAKER STATES AND FOREIGN POLICY = 13
• Prospect Theory and Decision Making Under Risk = 13
• Prospect Theory, Weaker States and Foreign Policy = 18
• Methodological Issues = 34
• CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW = 42
• Introduction = 42
• Security-Based Explanations = 44
• Explanations by Domestic Determinants = 57
• Explanation by Decision Theory : Prospect Theory = 60
• Summary = 62
• CHAPTER 4 FROM CONFRONTATION TO ENGAGEMENT : THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS, 1989-1994 = 65
• Introduction = 65
• Framing North Korea's Post-Cold War Domain of Action = 66
• Evaluating North Korea's Policy Options after the Cold War = 77
• Re-Framing North Korea's Domain of Action : June 1994 = 86
• Pyongyang Changes Its Course of Action : June 1994 = 92
• North Korea's Domestic Situation and Nuclear Policy : 1989-1994 = 95
• Summary = 99
• CHAPTER 5 FROM ENGAGEMENT TO CONFRONTATION : THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND SECOND NUCLEAR CRISIS = 101
• Introduction = 101
• The Agreed Framework, The Clinton Administration and North Korea : Post-June 1994 = 102
• The Agreed Framework, The Bush Administration and North Korea : Pre-October 2002 = 112
• The Collapse of the Agreed Framework : October 2002 = 121
• The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis : Post-October 2002 = 127
• Summary = 141
• CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION = 143
• Grand Summary = 143
• Competing Explanations = 146
• Policy Implication and Application = 150
• Theoretical Implications = 157
• Concluding Remarks = 159
• BIBLIOGRAPHY = 161