비대칭정보에 따른 보험시장실패와 정책 제언 = The analysis on the Insurance Market Failure and Proposal

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyse the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and then to seek the proposal of the economically corresponding schemes about asymmetric information from adverse selection and moral hazard. For this purpose, especially this paper explains theoretically and mathematically the adverse selection and moral hazard. Also this paper analyse the insurance market failure from the asymmetric information of adverse selection and moral hazard. The problems created by adverse selection and moral hazard are an important impediment to well functioning insurance markets, so insurance market failure occurs because of those problems. In addition to it, this paper analyse the reasons why insurance markets may fail to exist and why those that do exist may not exploit all of the mutual benefits to risk-sharing. In conclusion, for the economically corresponding schemes of the problems from adverse selection and moral hazard, authorities and insurers should plan and manage some solutions such as norm or system to mitigate the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, collateral, monitoring and enforcement of restrictive covenants etc.

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