국제조세분쟁에서 상호합의절차와 국내 구제절차의 권한배분 구조에 관한 연구 = Allocation of Authority between Mutual Agreement Procedures and Domestic Remedies in International Tax Disputes

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

International double taxation creates significant uncertainty for multinational business activities and serves as a major obstacle to cross-border trade and investment. Although the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) has been utilized as an international dispute resolution mechanism to address such problems, structural issues may arise when MAP proceeds in parallel with domestic remedies, including procedural conflicts, uncertainty in the allocation of authority, and inefficiencies in dispute resolution.
This study reconceptualizes the relationship between MAP and domestic remedies not merely as an issue of parallel proceedings, but as a structural problem concerning how authority over dispute resolution should be allocated between international coordination and domestic judicial control. From this perspective, the study conducts a comparative legal analysis of the systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
The comparative analysis demonstrates that the three jurisdictions adopt different models of authority allocation between MAP and domestic remedies, ranging from judicially dominant approaches to hybrid adjustment mechanisms. The United States emphasizes domestic judicial decisions, the United Kingdom employs procedural control mechanisms to coordinate conflicts, and Germany allows limited ex post adjustments through MAP even after domestic judicial decisions, thereby preserving greater flexibility in eliminating international double taxation.
Based on this comparative analysis, this study argues that the Korean legal framework lacks clear standards governing the allocation of authority between MAP and domestic remedies and does not provide sufficient institutional mechanisms for coordinating procedural conflicts. In particular, the current framework tends to prioritize the finality of domestic judicial decisions, which may substantially limit the effectiveness of MAP and create tension with the principles of accessibility and effectiveness emphasized in OECD BEPS Action 14.
Accordingly, this study proposes several institutional reforms for Korea, including the introduction of procedural coordination and control mechanisms, the statutory clarification of allocation-of-authority standards, the limited acceptance of ex post adjustments through MAP, and the enhancement of MAP accessibility and procedural transparency. Ultimately, this study is significant in that it systematically analyzes the relationship between MAP and domestic remedies from the perspective of allocation of authority and suggests institutional as well as practical directions for achieving a more balanced operation between international coordination and domestic judicial control in international tax dispute resolution.