규범적 체계이론의 구상 = Conception of Normative Systems Theory

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Niklas Luhmann referred to ontology as “old european semantics” and argued that semantics in modern society shifts toward the “self-reference(self-production) of functional systems.” He suggested that while order was previously thought to be pre-given, it is now formed by the functional system itself. This shift in semantics is closely linked to the forms of social differentiation. According to Luhmann, the form of differentiation in modern society has changed from a stratified society to a functionally differentiated society. From this perspective, Luhmann views the “differentiation of functional systems” and the “self-reference(operational closure) of functional systems” as the same concept. In other words, the functional differentiation of a system is achieved through the system’s self-reference.
I have developed the following three arguments from the perspective of normative social theory. The first concerns functional differentiation. While I accept the functional differentiation proposed by Luhmann as the primary form of differentiation in society, I argue that the autonomy(self-reference) of functional systems other than the economic system has been violated due to the totality of capitalism. I set the restoration of the self-reference of functional systems from the totality of capitalism as a normative task.
The second aspect concerns the relationships between humans and between humans and nature. Even though the form of social differentiation has shifted from stratification to functional differentiation, issues of stratification and ecological hazard remain serious in contemporary society. Focusing on the fact that stratification and ecological problems stem from the relationships between humans and between humans and nature, I believe that the realm of relation can be established as a foundation existing prior to the operation of the functional system. This serves as a basis for making normative demands on the functional system. Furthermore, it becomes a space for social theories regarding areas that are difficult to explain through systems theory, such as the recognition movement and the ecological movement. The ‘realm of relation’ is closely linked to relational ontology.
The third point concerns the referentiality of the system. Unlike Luhmann’s view, I believe that the functional differentiation of a system does not coincide with its self-reference(operational closure). If the two coincided, a significant portion of the social space where the normative perspective of social theory intervenes would disappear. The second and third arguments are connected: in the realm of relation, the system must exercise “reference based on relation.” In realms outside of relation, I accept the “self-reference of the system” advocated by Luhmann.