This study critically examines the limitations of moral education that have primarily emphasized the understanding of moral norms and the development of moral judgment. It begins from the premise that many instances of moral failure occur not at the s...
This study critically examines the limitations of moral education that have primarily emphasized the understanding of moral norms and the development of moral judgment. It begins from the premise that many instances of moral failure occur not at the stage of judgment, but at a pre-judgmental level, where individuals fail to notice morally salient features of a situation. Accordingly, morality is reconceptualized not as the outcome of rule application or reasoning alone, but as a capacity grounded in moral attention and reflection.
Drawing on contemporary moral psychology and virtue ethics, the study clarifies the educational significance of moral attention and reflection, and demonstrates— through Rest’s Four-Component Model and Narvaez’s theory of moral expertise— that moral sensitivity and self-regulation function as essential preconditions for moral judgment and action. Dewey’s theory of reflective thought is also examined to acknowledge its contribution to reflection-centered moral instruction, while pointing out its limitations in addressing the sustained regulation of an individual’s everyday mental state. The study then analyzes Toe-gye Yi Hwang’s theory of Ju-gyeong (主敬, sustained reverent attention), arguing that Gyeong (敬) constitutes a continuous moral disposition that enables ethical practice through a cyclical structure of cultivation and self-examination. On this basis, moral education is reconceptualized as a repetitive process of attention–reflection–correction–moral cultivation, and Ju-gyeong (主敬) is presented as a significant intellectual resource within the Korean Confucian tradition that can theoretically enrich contemporary models of attention- and reflection-based moral education.