공공안전 인프라로서 민간 저궤도 위성 활용과 국제 우주법상 통제ㆍ귀속 기준 = Private Low Earth Orbit Satellites as Public Safety Infrastructure and the Standards of Control and Attribution under International Space Law

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This article examines how the structure of control and attribution under international space law should be reinterpreted and refined in light of the expanding use of privately operated satellite infrastructure in the field of public safety. The existing framework of international space law, centered on Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, adopts a state-centric model under which States bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space and are obliged to authorize and continuously supervise activities conducted by non-governmental entities. Accordingly, private satellite activities formally remain under State control, and international responsibility is attributed to the State.
However, the proliferation of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations and the rapid expansion of commercial space activities have fundamentally transformed the operational structure of space activities. In particular, the direct integration of private satellite services—such as communications, Earth observation, and data provision—into public safety functions, including disaster response, policing, and crisis management, has generated structural tensions between the traditional State-centric responsibility model and the reality of private operational actors. In this context, the scope and content of authorization and supervision obligations, as well as the criteria for attributing conduct between private activities and State functions, emerge as central issues.
While Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty establishes international responsibility for non-governmental space activities, it does not provide clear standards concerning the concrete modalities or intensity of control and supervision. Similarly, the Liability Convention and the Registration Convention maintain a State-centered framework of jurisdiction and responsibility through the concepts of launching State and State of registry, yet they do not sufficiently elaborate detailed criteria adapted to large-scale private satellite constellations or to the functional integration of private systems into public safety operations. The core issue, therefore, is not the normative validity of the State-centric structure itself, but whether it can operate effectively within today’s complex public–private hybrid environment.
After analyzing the technical and operational characteristics of LEO satellites and the legal nature of public safety functions, this article reassesses the authorization and continuing supervision obligation in light of the functional convergence between private satellite activities and State functions. In particular, it explores the relevance of the due diligence principle and the criterion of effective control in developing a more substantive supervisory framework. It also considers the structural risks associated with space debris and large-scale constellation operations, thereby identifying the limitations of a predominantly soft-law-based regulatory regime and possible directions for its refinement.
In conclusion, the use of private satellites for public safety purposes increasingly forms part of the functional execution of State responsibilities. Correspondingly, the framework of control and attribution under international space law requires further refinement through function-oriented and differentiated criteria. This does not entail abandoning the State-centric responsibility model, but rather operationalizing the authorization and continuing supervision obligation so as to align the existing legal structure with the evolving public–private configuration of contemporary space activities.