보호무역적 ESG 규범 환경에서 CSDDD와 OECD 다국적기업 가이드라인 도입 순서의 경제적 효율성 분석 = Economic Efficiency of Compliance Sequencing between the CSDDD and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in a Protectionist ESG Regulation

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes the economic efficiency of compliance sequencing between the CSDDD and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises within an ESG regulatory environment characterized by trade-restrictive effects. While existing studies focus mainly on the legal nature and substantive alignment of these regimes, this paper argues that the order of compliance adoption is a critical strategic determinant of firms’ costs, risks, and procedural efficiency.
Drawing on institutional sequencing theory and a game-theoretic coordination framework, the study models strategic interactions between firms and their supply chains. The analysis shows that no single compliance strategy dominates. Instead, equilibrium outcomes vary according to firms’ cost structures and failure risks. Large firms, with greater capacity to absorb compliance costs, are more likely to adopt simultaneous compliance, whereas small and medium-sized enterprises tend to prefer sequential compliance to mitigate existential financial risks.
The findings suggest that government policy should function as a coordinator of the institutional environment, rather than prescribing a uniform compliance path. By conceptualizing ESG compliance as a strategic choice problem, this study contributes to the literature and offers policy-relevant insights for mitigating the trade-restrictive effects of ESG regulations while maintaining firms’ international competitiveness.