This study examines the rationality underlying the actions of policymakers in the decision-making process of the Republic of Korea’s overseas troop deployment policy. Overseas deployment decisions involve complex interactions among national security...
This study examines the rationality underlying the actions of policymakers in the decision-making process of the Republic of Korea’s overseas troop deployment policy. Overseas deployment decisions involve complex interactions among national security, diplomacy, politics, and economics beyond purely military considerations. This study analyzes the rationality of each policymaker’s actions—focusing on the President and the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Assembly—based on Herbert Simon’s concepts of bounded and procedural rationality. The analysis finds that the President and the NSC demonstrated strategic and institutional rationality through the coordination of national strategic goals; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs exhibited value rationality emphasizing international legitimacy and diplomatic credibility; the Ministry of National Defense applied instrumental rationality centered on mission performance and risk management; and the National Assembly pursued procedural rationality to ensure democratic oversight and procedural legitimacy. However, information asymmetry, limited inter-agency coordination, and insufficient public engagement revealed the bounded nature of rationality in policy decisions. This study contributes to understanding how multi-agency interactions shape rationality in policy processes and suggests that Korea’s overseas deployment policy should evolve toward a decision-making system that ensures substantive rationality and democratic legitimacy beyond formal legality.