오만과 타협: W. W. 로스토우와 근대화론의 변화 = Hubris and Compromise: W. W. Rostow and the Transformation of Modernization Theory

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This article demonstrates that W. W. Rostow’s modernization theory of the 1960s was the product of compromises he made with political power in the 1950s. Rostow’s theory―most notably articulated in The Stages of Economic Growth (1960)―have been criticized for its hubristic arguments regarding the linear process of modernization, the universal applicability of the American model of capitalism, and the United States’ ability to transform “backward” societies across the world. These arguments convinced U.S. policymakers in the 1960s and thereby paved the way to the imperialistic wars in Vietnam and other places of the Third World. This course, however, was neither preordained nor inevitable. Until the early 1950s, Rostow had given serious attention to the particularities of each society, power of nationalism in Asian and Africa, and long and dark shadow of European imperialism in the Third World. Rostow’s engagement with the Eisenhower administration in the 1950s was critical in reshaping his theory. At the behest of Eisenhower’s adviser C. D. Jackson, Rostow tried to promote his theory among the Republicans in power. In so doing, he accepted a series of compromises by remaking his theory softer and simpler―thus more acceptable to the policymakers. Through the process, his theory had gradually become hubristic― overconfident in the ability of almighty America, arrogant at backward countries, and ignorant about imperialism of the past and present. The previous scholarship presumed Rostow’s modernization theory as something already given, while focusing exclusively on its evil influence on the Vietnam War. My narrative on Rostow’s transformation will give fresh insights into the relationship between intellectuals and political power.